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IN THE MEANTIME: STATE PROTECTION OF
DISABILITY CIVIL RIGHTS
Sande L. Buhai *
I. INTRODUCTION
The traditional late-twentieth century United States approach to
civil rights protection looked to the federal government for
leadership. In recent years, however, federal courts have cut back
significantly on the scope and effectiveness of federal remedies for
civil rights violations. While disappointing, this development should
not trigger pessimism in the long term. The federal civil rights
pendulum periodically reverses directions with remarkable
consistency. History thus suggests that renewed activism at the
federal level will eventually follow the current era of weaker federal
civil rights enforcement. Meanwhile, much is happening in state
civil rights law. Justice Brandeis once observed that a "single
courageous State" could serve as a laboratory for experiments that
might lead to advances for society as a whole.' This paper will, in
effect, explore Brandeis's thesis, focusing on state protection of the
rights of people with disabilities. Developments in the various states,
I suggest, will ultimately make federal civil rights protections more
effective, when the pendulum reverses yet again.
In a recent, well-done article, Claudia Center and Andrew
Imparato argue that the federal definition of disability should be
* I would like to thank the Symposium Editors, Professor Gary Williams, and
Adam Gardner for the opportunity to write this article and Loyola Law School
for their continued support of my scholarship. I would also like to recognize
the excellent contributions by Loyola Law School students Minn Chung, who
did much of the work on the history of Section 1983, and Tiffany Leneis, who
did much of the work about mitigating measures. The staff and editors of the
Loyola Law Review were wonderful to work with.
1. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310-11 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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redrafted to better protect the rights of people with disabilities,2
effectively overturning at least some of the recent Supreme Court
decisions in the area. Although I agree with Center and Imparato
that a new and better definition of disability would help in the
struggle for civil rights, based on the history of federal civil rights
protections discussed in Part II, I am not hopeful that any such new
definition will be enacted in the near future. Until the federal
government broadens its definition of disability, I look to the States
to continue developing new and more effective ways to remedy
discrimination on the basis of disability.
Part II reviews the broad swings of the federal civil fights
pendulum. Although this history is not new, it bears remembering, if
only to place current disappointments in context. In the course of
reviewing the broad outlines of federal civil rights history, Part II
suggests that developments in the federal protection of people with
disabilities can be usefully understood as part of a much larger
tapestry. In the area of disability rights, federal protections have
been substantially limited in recent years. However, history
illustrates that this current retreat should not be viewed as permanent.
In the meantime, there is useful work to be done at the state
level. Part III explores various states' current experiments in the
protection of persons with disabilities, focusing on three specific
issues: (1) the defimition of disability as a substantial
impairment/limitation of a major life activity, (2) the use of
mitigating measures in determining whether someone is disabled,
and (3) the requirement to participate in an "interactive process." In
each context, advocates for the reinvigoration of federal protections
would do well to heed the results of these state experiments.3
II. THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS PENDULUM
Expansive federal protection of civil rights first emerged from
the schisms of the American Civil War. The Civil Rights Act of
1871, Section 1 of which is now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983
("Section 1983"), followed the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
2. Claudia Center & Andrew Imparato, Redefining "Disability"
Discrimination: A Proposal to Restore Civil Rights Protections to All Workers,
14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 321, 323-24 (2003).
3. The appendix to this Article provides a summary outline of State laws
that protect people with disabilities, but does not purport to be exhaustive.
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Amendments (collectively "The Civil War Amendments"). Enacted
"for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment, ' 4 Section 1983 authorizes relief whenever someone
acting under color of state law violates a party's federally protected
rights.5
These first civil rights laws reflected a substantial extension of
federal power over the states. Congress found a federal remedy for
deprivations of federal rights necessary because it believed state
authorities appeared either unable or unwilling to control widespread
6violence against African Americans. In particular, the 1871
Congress mistrusted the integrity and ability of the fact-finding
processes of state courts adjudicating protected rights. Section 1983
was therefore enacted to create a federal remedy that "protect[s] the
people from unconstitutional action under color of state law.",
7
During the same period, Congress enacted other laws that
complemented or further enforced the Civil War Amendments,
granting federal habeas corpus jurisdiction over state judgments in
18678 and establishing general federal-question jurisdiction in 1875.9
Taken collectively, the Civil War Amendments, Civil Rights Acts,
and new jurisdictional statutes, all emerging from the caldron of the
Civil War, marked a fundamental shift in the relationship among
individuals, the states, and the federal government.
10
4. Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 495 U.S. 182, 187 (1990); Quem v. Jordan, 440
U.S. 332, 350 n.2 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring).
5. The current version of the statute provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
6. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985) ("The specific historical
catalyst for the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was the campaign of violence and
deception in the South, fomented by the Ku Klux Klan, which was denying
decent citizens their civil and political rights.").
7. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972).
8. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385.
9. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137 §§ 1-2, 18 Stat. pt.3, 470, 470-71.
10. Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual
Rights-Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 6
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Certainly, this transformation to dominance by federal law in the
civil rights area was not accidental. As the Supreme Court stated in
Mitchum:
Congress clearly conceived that it was altering the
relationship between the States and the Nation with respect
to the protection of federally created rights; it was
concerned that state instrumentalities could not protect
those rights; it realized that state officers might, in fact, be
antipathetic to the vindication of those rights; and it
believed that these failings extended to the state courts.
Section 1983 was thus a product of a vast transformation
from the concepts of federalism that had prevailed in the
late 18th century .... The very purpose of § 1983 was to
interpose the federal courts between the States and the
people, as guardians of the people's federal rights-to
protect the people from unconstitutional action under color
of state law, "whether that action be executive, legislative,
or judicial."'
Thus, the Civil War, itself the ultimate exercise of federal power, and
the Reconstruction that followed it "established a new legal order
that contemplated direct federal intervention in what had [previously]
been considered [exclusively] to be state affairs, a system in which
federal courts were to enforce newly created federal constitutional
rights against state officials through civil remedies and criminal
sanctions."' 2
With the election of 1876, however, Reconstruction effectively
came to an end. A disputed presidential race was resolved by an
agreement to recognize Republican Rutherford B. Hayes as President
in exchange for a promise to withdraw federal troops from the
South. 13  Prior to the War, the South had been controlled by
Democrats. In a series of state elections bracketing that presidential
(1985). See also, FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF
THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 64-65
(1928).
11. Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 242 (quoting Ex Parte Virginia., 100 U.S. 339,
346 (1879) (emphases added).
12. Blackmun, supra note 10, at 7-8.
13. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN v. BOARD
OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 61-62
(1976).
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election, white Democrats retook control of all of the southern state
governments. 14  Almost immediately, African Americans were
disenfranchised. Federal prosecutions under the Civil Right Acts
declined precipitously. In 1873, 1304 prosecutions were brought, of
which 1271 were brought in the South.' 5 By 1878, that figure had
dropped markedly to 25.16
In 1894, Congress repealed a number of the provisions of the
Civil Rights Acts, including 39 sections of the Revised Statutes
dealing with the right to vote.17 In 1890, Mississippi passed a new
suffrage law, imposing a $2 poll tax and exhaustive literacy
requirements.18 In 1895, South Carolina passed a similar law, adding
an imposing property requirement. 19 Louisiana also passed a similar
statute, with prohibitive education and property requirements, but a
grandfather clause nevertheless preserved the right of poor, illiterate
whites to vote.20 By 1910, every Southern State had followed suit.
21
In 1896, 130,344 African Americans were registered to vote in
22 2Louisiana. By 1900, only 5320 remained on the books.23
The first segregation laws were passed in 1892, requiring
railroads to assign African American passengers to separate cars.
Jim Crow Laws spread from passenger trains to streetcars,
restaurants, washrooms, and residential communities. Without the
enforcement of federal civil rights laws, lynch mobs reared their ugly
heads. Some 3000 lynchings were committed from 1883 to 1903
with few, if any, reprisals against the perpetrators.
24
At the same time, the Supreme Court "cut the heart out of the
Civil Rights Acts" through narrow readings of the Civil War
Amendments.25 In the Slaughter-House Cases,26 decided in 1872,
14. See id. at 58-62.
15. William W. Davis, The Federal Enforcement Act, in STUDIES IN
SOUTHERN HISTORY AND POLITICS 205, 224 (James W. Gamer ed., 1994).
16. Id.
17. Act of Feb. 8, 1894, ch. 25, 28 Stat. 36.
18. KLUGER, supra note 13, at 67.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 67-68.
21. Id. at 68.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Blackmun, supra note 10, at 9.
26. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
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the Court held that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment did not federalize any substantive rights not
27already incidental to national citizenship. The Court then reviewed
a series of actions brought under the Civil Rights Acts and held in
each that Congress' power under the Amendment was limited to
addressing direct encroachment of civil rights by states.2 8 In the
Civil Rights Cases,29 decided in 1883, the Court invalidated the 1875
Act's prohibition of private racial discrimination in accommodations
and public conveyances. 30 The Act could not be upheld under the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court ruled, because it did not target
state action despite the fact that states licensed most of the public
accommodations at issue. 31  Nor could it be upheld under the
Thirteenth Amendment, because even though that Amendment
reached private action, denial of admission to a public place was not
a badge or incident of slavery.32 As a result of these and other
decisions, "major provisions of the [Civil Rights] Acts either were
declared unconstitutional or were emasculated .... Those sections
that were not struck down were largely forgotten. 33  Less than
twenty years after the close of the Civil War, the federal
government's commitment to the protection of civil rights had all but
disappeared. When segregation became law, Plessy v. Ferguson
34
completed the retreat, upholding Jim Crow Laws notwithstanding the
fact that they indisputably constituted state action.
35
The issue lay essentially dormant until after World War II, when
calls for desegregation and civil rights for African Americans grew
into a powerful political and social movement. By the 1950s and
1960s, the new movement had clogged the federal courts with cases
challenging the segregation laws on federal constitutional grounds.
36
27. Id. at 74.
28. Id. at 80-81.
29. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
30. Id. at 17, 24.
31. Id. at 11-14.
32. Id. at 24-25.
33. Blackmun, supra note 10, at 10.
34. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
35. Id. at 550-51.
36. See JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: How A DEDICATED
BAND OF LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 306-17
(1994) (describing sit-in cases litigated by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund in
the Supreme Court); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE WARREN COURT AND THE
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This forced the federal government to choose between the high ideals
of equality its founders had articulated (although not implemented)
and a system of racial oppression profoundly at odds with those
ideals. 37 The Supreme Court eventually responded by resurrecting
the Reconstruction-era civil rights laws; Congress responded by
adopting a series of new civil rights statutes, including the Civil
Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.38
These actions by the federal government caused a sweeping change
in American society-a transformation so remarkable it is sometimes
called "the Second Reconstruction."
39
Brown v. Board of Education40 was itself a Section 1983 case,
even though the Supreme Court's opinion made no mention of the
41Civil Rights Act. Most of the major desegregation cases that
followed, in which the Court expanded Brown to beaches, buses, and
other public accommodations, were also Section 1983 cases.42 The
case that most clearly announced the revival of Section 1983,
however, was Monroe v. Pape,43 decided in 1961. At least on its
face, Monroe had nothing to do with race, segregation, or any of the
social issues that had led to the Civil War. Instead, the issue was
whether Chicago police officers charged with conducting an
unconstitutional search and arrest could be liable under Section 1983
PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 38-48 (1998) (describing the civil disobedience decisions
of the Supreme Court between 1964 and 1967); LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE
WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 227-29 (2000) (describing sit-in
cases of 1963 and 1964).
37. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law:
Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE
L.J. 441, 487-88 (2000).
38. See id. at 487.
39. See e.g., MANNING MARABLE, RACE, REFORM, AND REBELLION: THE
SECOND RECONSTRUCTION IN BLACK AMERICA, 1945-1990 (2d ed. 1991);
CARL M. BRAUER, JOHN F. KENNEDY AND THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION
(1977); Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofinan, The Voting Rights Act and
the Second Reconstruction, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT
OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965-1990, at 378 (Chandler Davidson &
Bernard Grofnan eds., 1994).
40. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
41. Blackmun, supra note 10, at 19.
42. Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (concerning city and state laws
requiring racial segregation on public buses); Mayor of Balt. v. Dawson, 350
U.S. 877 (1955) (concerning racial segregation of public beaches maintained
by public authorities);
43. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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even though state law did not specifically authorize their actions.
44
The Court surveyed the legislative history of the Act and found it
abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed
was to afford a federal right in federal courts because, by
reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or
otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims
of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and
immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
might be denied by the state agencies.45
After Monroe, the number of cases brought under Section 1983
increased dramatically, and the types of problems these cases
addressed expanded radically. While a mere 270 federal civil rights
actions were filed in 1961, by the end of the 1990s, tens of thousands
of Section 1983 actions were filed in federal court each year.46
These actions included desegregation cases as well as cases
challenging state restrictions on the right to vote, from poll taxes and
white primaries to unequal apportionment schemes.47 In the First
Amendment context, Section 1983 was invoked to strike down state-
mandated loyalty oaths48 and Louisiana's Subversive Activities and
Communist Control Law.49 A Section 1983 case established that a
welfare recipient has a right to notice and a hearing before a state can
terminate his benefits, 50 and other Section 1983 cases have since
confirmed the due process rights of recipients of utility service,51
44. See id. at 203-04 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 180.
46. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 611 (1998) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
47. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 622 (1969)
(challenging the constitutionality of a New York law limiting school district
voter eligibility to those owning property in the district and those having
children enrolled in the district); Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,
664 (1966) (challenging the constitutionality of a poll tax); Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 537 (1964) (challenging the appointment of seats in the Alabama
legislature); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 370 (1963) (challenging primary
election system giving greater weight to the votes of citizens of rural counties
than those of citizens of urban counties).
48. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
49. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
50. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
51. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978).
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public employees,52 employees entitled under state law to seek
redress for unlawful discharge,53 and debtors whose property is about
to be seized by individuals or the state.54  Section 1983 cases
successfully challenged unequal age limitations for males and
females on the sale of beer 55 and limitations on the right to marry the
person of one's choice.56 Moreover, they granted mental patients
and prisoners First Amendment freedoms, basic medical care, and
due process rights notwithstanding their institutionalization.
57
Unsurprisingly, this Second Reconstruction met stiff initial
resistance from the states. In particular, Southern states resisted
federal rules that challenged their traditional racially oppressive
practices. The South's filibuster of the 1965 civil rights bill in the
Senate, for example, "was the longest on record, eighty-two days,"
taking up "63,000 pages of the Congressional Record. 58  This
protracted struggle, however, fundamentally altered the ways in
which Americans reasoned about national power, federalism, and
liberty. 9 In time, resistance gave way to national consensus. At
least in principle, Americans came to celebrate the protection of civil
rights as one of the defining characteristics of their nation.60 By the
52. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593 (1972).
53. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
54. Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
55. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
56. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
57. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (holding for a
patient who brought suit against a state mental hospital under § 1983 for
keeping him against his will); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (holding
for a prisoner who brought suit against a state prison under § 1983 for
subjecting him to cruel and unusual punishment); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539 (1974) (holding for a prisoner who brought suit against a state prison
under § 1983 for violating his due process); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972)
(holding for a prisoner who brought suit against a state prison under § 1983 for
religious discrimination).
58. LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS
233 (2000). "[T]he Civil Rights Act passed the House of Representatives by
the overwhelming bipartisan margin of 290-130, 104 of the dissenters being
southern Democrats, who fully understood that this bill was aimed directly at
the white South." Id. at 232.
59. Post & Siegel, supra note 37, at 492.
60. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 137
(1991) (discussing how Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
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end of the 1960s, authority to protect civil rights, placed in federal
hands by the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment but removed by
politics and the Supreme Court for almost a century, had been
returned to the national government.
6 1
For some time now, of course, the pendulum has been swinging
in the opposite direction--cutting against expanded civil rights
protections. The Court has limited damages awards available under
Section 1983 by expanding the Eleventh Amendment immunity of
states, 62 establishing absolute immunity for judges and legislators,
63
and granting good-faith immunity for other state and local officials
unless a federal court defines the exact requirements of the
constitutional right at issue prior to the alleged violation.
64
In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,65 the Court held that
Congress had no power under the Commerce Clause to abrogate the
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity.66 As a result, Congress can
now authorize private suits against the states only pursuant to Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 67 In Kimel v. Florida Board of
Regents,68 the Court held that since the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act was vastly overbroad, prohibiting many state acts
not themselves unconstitutional, its purported abrogation of the
Eleventh Amendment immunity for state actors in age discrimination
suits was invalid.69
A common thread running through many of these decisions is
the Court's concern about federalism, 70 which is often used as
"became a symbol energizing a multiracial coalition of blacks and whites into
an escalating political struggle against institutionalized racism").
61. Post & Siegel, supra note 37, at 508.
62. Quem v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
63. Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc.,
446 U.S. 719 (1980).
64. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 197 (1984).
65. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
66. Id. at 76.
67. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (reasoning that the
Fourteenth Amendment, which was adopted after the Eleventh Amendment,
places express limits on the states and provides Congress with the power to
enforce these limits).
68. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
69. Id. at91.
70. See Daan Braveman, Enforcement Of Federal Rights Against States:
Alden and Federalism Non-Sense, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 611 (2000); Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Hypocrisy of Alden v. Maine: Judicial Review, Sovereign
1074
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shorthand for a new doctrine of "states' rights"--protecting the
rights of states against federal action.7' Since federal protection of
civil rights originated as an expression of distrust of the states and as
a deliberate encroachment into areas previously reserved to the
states, these decisions have been, at best, controversial.72
It is against this background that we should understand the
history of and recent developments in federal disability rights law.
In the United States, people with disabilities have long been the
subject of discrimination. 73  Until the late-nineteenth or early-
twentieth century, disability was generally viewed as a punishment
or test imposed by God. "'God, in His mysterious wisdom, had
afflicted someone with this particular burden, and they were
supposed to bear it with patience and faith .... Disabilities
Immunity and the Rehnquist Court, 33 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1283 (2000);
Michael H. Gottesman, Disability, Federalism, and a Court with an Eccentric
Mission, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 31 (2001); Roger C. Hartley, The New Federalism
and the ADA: State Sovereign Immunity from Private Damage Suits After
Boeme, 24 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 481 (1998). ;.
71. Literal meaning of federalism is the division of powers among national
and subordinate governments. See Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism,
47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1502 (1994) (suggesting that there are "two sides to
federalism: not just preserving state authority where appropriate, but also
enabling the federal government to act where national action is desirable");
Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP.
CT. REV. 125, 135-37 (1996) (discussing balance of powers contemplated by
federalism).
72. See Frank B. Cross, Realism About Federalism, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1304 (1999) (arguing against expanded federalism and demonstrating that
courts are using federalism doctrine for political or ideological reasons);
Daniel J. Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in Search of a
Theory, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1011 (2000) (explaining that the Supreme
Court's Eleventh Amendment decisions cause harm while failing to promote
any coherent conception of state autonomy); James G. Wilson, The Eleventh
Amendment Cases: Going "Too Far" with Judicial Neofederalism, 33 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1687, 1687 (2000) (labeling the Supreme Court's recent Eleventh
Amendment decisions as "some of its worst in decades" for improperly
"dilut[ing] the constitutional and federal statutory rights of millions of
people")..
73. People with disabilities suffered tremendous persecution throughout
history. See generally Marcia Pearce Burgdorf & Robert Burgdorf, Jr., A
History of Unequal Treatment: The Qualifications of Handicapped Persons as
a "Suspect Class" Under the Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANA CLARA L.
REV. 855 (1975) (discussing the historically unequal treatment of the disabled).
74. Cheryl L. Anderson, "Deserving Disabilities": Why the Definition of
Disability Under the Americans with Disabilities Act Should be Revised to
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reflected "the external expression of an individual's sinfulness and
moral impurity. ',75 Disability was "brought on by sin.
',7 6
Around a century ago, this harsh moral model gradually gave
way to a more compassionate medical/charity model, which instead
viewed people with disabilities as objects of pity, philanthropy, and
paternalistic rehabilitation. 77  In 1918, the Smith-Sears Veterans'
Rehabilitation Act established a federal rehabilitation program for
disabled soldiers. 78 In 1920, Congress passed the Smith-Fess Act for
civilians. 79 In 1934, consistent with this new model, the first Easter
Seal pictured a sad boy with leg braces and crutches with the text:
"Help Crippled Children." 80 When Congress created Social Security
in 1935, it included a disability insurance component.81 A number of
states created welfare programs at about the same time; most
included provisions for people with disabilities. These state
programs, for the most part, were subsumed in the federal
Supplemental Security Income program in the mid-1970s.
82
The medical/charity model was focused on the disability. The
disability presented the problem; it limited the individual's role in
society. Absent either a cure or a technological advance, a disabled
person would be excluded from work and social activities due to her
disability and therefore, through no fault of society, would remain an
Eliminate the Substantial Limitation Requirement, 65 MO. L. REV. 83, 88
(2000) (citation omitted).
75. Paula E. Berg, IlI/Legal: Interrogating the Meaning and Function of the
Category of Disability in Anti-Discrimination Law, 18 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
1,5 (1999).
76. JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, No PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A
NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 30 (1993).
77. Id.
78. Chai R. Feldblum, Definition Of Disability Under Federal Anti-
Discrimination Law: What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?,
21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 95 (2000).
79. Id. at 95-96. In 1943, Congress passed the Vocational Rehabilitation
Amendments adding physical rehabilitation and certain health care services.
Vocational Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1943, ch. 190, § 3(a)(3), 57
Stat. 374, 376.
80. In 1938, the March of Dimes also adopted a medical/charity mode of
disability-related fundraising, portraying children with disabilities as the
natural objects of charity.
81. See SHAPIRO, supra note 76, at 62.
82. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat.
1329.
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object of pity and charity. The model expected individuals with
disabilities to "fix" themselves, using medicine, rehabilitation, and
training. Apart from pity and philanthropy, it asked nothing of
society; in particular, it did nothing to challenge society's view of
people with disabilities as different and inferior.
The civil rights movements of the 1960s and 1970s stimulated
development of a new model of disability, a civil rights model,
which challenged the medical/charity paradigm. 83 This new model
asserted that disability, like race, primarily stemmed from a social
construct-a series of decisions by society to make disability
matter.8 4 Under this new model, people with disabilities were not
inherently different from those without disabilities in any substantive
way.8 5 Instead, society had unnecessarily constructed a world that
made disabilities relevant. The disability, itself, did not create the
barrier; the stairs imposed the barrier. They had been built as the
result of a societal decision to favor stairs over ramps-to favor
people who walked over those using wheelchairs. Society, not the
large minority who had difficulties with stairs, had created the
barriers. Problems people with disabilities faced were thus reframed
as the result of societal attitudes and discrimination, not the
inevitable consequences of the disabilities themselves.
86
Modeled after civil rights laws applicable to other groups, the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973,87 the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act of 1975,88 the Fair Housing Amendments Act of
83. Feldblum, supra note 78, at 97.
84. Berg, supra note 75, at 9.
85. See id.
86. Id. (Disabilities are "'socially constructed phenomena brought about by
attitudes toward people with disabilities which, once embedded in social
practices and institutions, sustain the disadvantageous social condition of
people with disabilities."'(quoting JEROME E. BICKENBACH, PHYSICAL
DISABILITY AND SOCIAL POLICY 13 (1993)).
87. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (2000).
88. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 1973, 20 U.S.C. §§
1400-1487 (2000). Consistent with the early harsh affliction paradigm, the
first public schools excluded children with disabilities. Instead, families were
expected to educate their disabled children at home. Adoption of a
medical/charity model did little to change the situation. Prior to 1975, public
education of children with special needs was not legally required. The civil
rights paradigm, however, brought change. In education, the IDEA embodied
the new paradigm. The IDEA represented the first nationwide effort to
promote the education of children with disabilities; it reflected Congress's
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1988,89 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA") 90
all invoked this civil rights model.9' The aforementioned acts shared
a common premise: People with disabilities were people like
everyone else, but they faced special barriers that fear, stereotyping,
and prejudice had erected against them.92  Instead of expecting
people with disabilities to overcome those barriers themselves, these
new acts required society to affirmatively dismantle any
unreasonable barriers it had created. 93  The assumption centered
around the idea that after the removal of those barriers, people with
disabilities would integrate into the mainstream.
94
concern that most children with disabilities "were either totally excluded from
schools or [were] sitting idly in regular classrooms awaiting the time when
they were old enough to 'drop out."' H.R. REP. No. 94-332, at 2 (1975).
Disability advocates then invoked Brown v. Board of Education to argue for
the inclusion of students with disabilities in regular classrooms. Disability
advocates argued that the use of separate facilities to educate students with
disabilities was similarly inherently unequal. Consequently, the IDEA was
amended to provide that students with disabilities should be provided
educational services in the "least restrictive environment." 20 U.S.C.
1412(a)(5).
89. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat.
1619 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2000)). The Fair
Housing Act was originally enacted to combat housing discrimination on the
basis of race, color, religion, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1968).
In 1988, it was extended by the Fair Housing Amendments Act ("FHAA") to
prohibit discrimination against people with disabilities as well. Feldblum,
supra note 78, at 121. The FHAA defines "handicap" in a manner consistent
with the Rehabilitation Act-which is to say, broadly. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h)
(2000). The ,Report of the Judiciary Committee of the House of
Representatives ("Report") sets forth the public policy in support of fair
housing for people with disabilities in all residential areas. H.R. REP. No. 100-
711, at 17-18 (1988). It rejects the use of generalized perceptions about
disabilities and unfounded speculations about threats to safety as grounds for
excluding people with disabilities from residential neighborhoods. Id. at 18. It
further states that "reasonable accommodations" must be provided to permit
people with disabilities to live in a dwelling of their choice. Id. at 24.
90. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213
(2000).
91. See Feldblum, supra note 78, at 98.
92. See Burgdorf& Burgdorf, supra note 73, at 883-89.
93. See generally, Arlene Mayerson, The History of the ADA: A Movement
Perspective, Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund (1992), at
http://www.empowermentzone.com/adahist.txt (discussing the history of
legislation leading to the passage of the ADA).
94. See id.
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Their language and legislative histories make clear the depth of
Congress's conversion and commitment to the civil rights model in
enacting these statutes. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, for example,
was enacted, in part, to prevent discrimination against all
handicapped individuals, regardless of their need for or ability to
benefit from vocational services, in relation to federal financial
assistance in the areas of employment, housing, transportation,
education, health services, or any other federally-aided programs. 95
Its most important operative provision, Section 504, was patterned
directly after Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,96 which
prohibited discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national
origin.97 In classic civil rights language, Section 504 stated: "No
otherwise qualified individual with a disability.., shall, solely by
reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance ... ,98
The remedies available under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
were the same as those available under Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. 99 Even the process of implementing these acts followed
the civil rights model: Massive demonstrations forced the issuance
of regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act.' 
00
The ADA, on which this article will focus, adopted a similarly
explicit civil rights approach to the problems people with disabilities
95. See 29 U.S.C. § 701(a)-(b). Initially, the Rehabilitation Act used the
term "individual with handicaps" to described the class it was intended to
protect. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1988). In 1992, after passage of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, the language of the Rehabilitation Act was
amended to conform to the terminology of that new act. "Individual with
handicaps" became "individuals with a disability." 29 U.S.C. § 706 (2002).
96. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000).
97. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-93 (1985).
98. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000).
99. Sande Buhai & Nina Golden, Adding Insult to Injury: Discriminatory
Intent as a Prerequisite to Damages Under the ADA, 52 RUTGERS L. REv.
1121, 1128-29 (2000). See Mark C. Weber, Disability Discrimination by State
and Local Government: The Relationship Between Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act and Title 11 of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 36 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 1089, 1093-95 (1995).
100. In 1977, after disability rights activists held sit-ins and demonstrations
across the country, including a sit-in of twenty-eight days in San Francisco, the
Department of Health Education and Welfare finally issued the regulations.
Weber, supra note 99, at 1095.
Spring 2004] 1079
8LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1065
encounter in the workplace. The statute itself declared that it had
been enacted to protect a "discrete and insular minority who have
been.., subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment."
10 1
The ADA describes its stated purpose as follows:
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate
for the elimination of discrimination against individuals
with disabilities;
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable
standards addressing discrimination against individuals
with disabilities;
(3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central
role in enforcing the standards established in [the ADA] on
behalf of individuals with disabilities; and
(4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority,
including the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment
and to regulate commerce, in order to address the major
areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with
disabilities.1
0 2
It characterized adverse employment decisions based on disabilities
to be a form of "discrimination" and identified the denial of
accommodations in the workplace as a form of discrimination as
well. 10 3 The Executive Director of the Leadership Conference on
Civil Rights, speaking in support of its passage, described the
proposed Act as "'the most comprehensive civil rights measure in the
past two and a half decades."'14 Senator Edward Kennedy called it
a "bill of rights" 0 5 and an "emancipation proclamation"' 0 6 for people
101. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7). Prior to the passage of the ADA, the
Rehabilitation Act required federal agencies and federally funded programs to
provide reasonable accommodations to persons with disabilities.
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994). See also RICHARD K.
SCOTCH, FROM GOOD WILL TO CIVIL RIGHTS: TRANSFORMING FEDERAL
DISABILITY POLICY (1984) (chronicling the history of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(l)-(4).
103. Id. § 12112.
104. Nathaniel C. Nash, Bush and Senate Leaders Support Sweeping
Protection for Disabled, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1989, at Al (quoting Ralph G.
Neas).
105. 135 CONG. REC. S10717 (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
106. Helen Dewar, Disability Legislation Approved; Senate Votes Ban on
Discrimination in Jobs, Services, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 1989, at Al.
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with disabilities. Senator Orrin Hatch called it "the most sweeping
piece of civil rights legislation since the Civil War era."'
10 7
Many critiques have been written about the failure of the ADA
to live up to expectations. 0 8 Authors have blamed Congress, the
Equal Opportunity Employment Commission ("EEOC"), and the
courts for this failure. 0 9 At least part of the problem, I suggest, is
that the ADA has fallen victim to the same adverse swing of the
federal civil rights pendulum that has limited enforcement of other
federal civil rights laws.
For example, after the Kimel decision invalidating the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act's abrogation of state sovereign
immunity, lower courts have split on whether the ADA could be
enforced against the states."l 0 Congress had explicitly abrogated the
107. 135 CONG. REc. S10714 (statement of Sen. Hatch).
108. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall
for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99 (1999) (arguing that
defendants prevail in ADA lawsuits due to both the courts' abuse of the
summary judgment device and their failure to defer to agency guidance in
ADA interpretation); Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 621 (1999) (arguing that imprecision in defining "disability"
has caused the large amount of litigation under the ADA); Bonnie Poitras
Tucker, The ADA's Revolving Door: Inherent Flaws in the Civil Rights
Paradigm, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 335 (2001) (arguing that Congress should have
based the ADA on human rights principles rather than on civil rights
principles);.
109. See sources cited supra note 108.
110. The Tenth Circuit and the Second Circuit upheld the ADA as applied to
the states after Kimel. See Cisneros v. Wilson, 226 F.3d 1113, 1128 (10th Cir.
2000); Kilcullen v. N.Y. State Dep't of Labor, 205 F.3d 77, 81-82 (2d Cir.
2000). Other courts also decided cases in favor of applying the ADA to the
states prior to Kimel. See Garrett v. Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs., 193 F.3d 1214,
1218 (1 lth Cir. 1999); Dare v. California, 191 F.3d 1167, 1175 (9th Cir. 1999);
Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298, 311 (2d Cir. 1999); Amos v. Md. Dep't of
Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 178 F.3d 212, 222-23 (4th Cir. 1999); Coolbaugh
v. Louisiana, 136 F.3d 430, 438 (5th Cir. 1998); Jones v. Commonwealth,
2000 WL 15073, at *1 (E.D. Pa. 2000); Johnson v. State Tech. Ctr. at
Memphis, 24 F. Supp. 2d 833, 842 (W.D. Tenn. 1998); Thrope v. Ohio, 19 F.
Supp. 2d 816, 821-22 (S.D. Ohio 1998); Lamb v. John Umstead Hosp., 19 F.
Supp. 2d 498, 510 (E.D.N.C. 1998); Meekison v. Voinovich, 17 F. Supp. 2d
725, 730 (S.D. Ohio 1998); Anderson v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 1 F. Supp. 2d
456, 468 (E.D. Pa. 1998); Williams v. Ohio Dep't of Mental Health, 960 F.
Supp. 1276, 1282-83 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
The Second and the Seventh Circuits found that the ADA was invalid
after Kimel. See Lavia v. Pennsylvania, 224 F.3d 190, 204-05 (3d Cir. 2000);
Erickson v. Bd. of Governors, 207 F.3d 945, 952 (7th Cir. 2000). Other
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states' immunity under Section 12202 of the ADA, declaring that
"[a] State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the
Constitution of the United States from an action in Federal or State
court.""' In 2001, in Board of Trustees of the University ofAlabama
v. Garrett,"12 the Supreme Court settled the issue, ruling that states
are immune from private suits for money damages under the
ADA. 1 3 In an unusually nondeferential review of congressional
fact-finding, the Court found that the record did not support
Congress's finding of a pattern of discrimination by the states."
14
While acknowledging that Congress had made findings of
discrimination against specific individuals with disabilities, the Court
concluded that these findings did not show a pattern of
discrimination by the states," 5 characterizing them instead as
"unexamined, anecdotal accounts of 'adverse, disparate treatment by
state officials.""' 6  The Court further stated that even if the
legislative history could be interpreted to show a pattern of disability
discrimination by the states, under Kimel, the remedies afforded
private litigants by the ADA were not "congruent and proportional"
to the harm caused by that discrimination" 7 -in other words, the
ADA's remedies were overbroad as applied to the states. State
responses to the ADA's requirement that employers reasonably
accommodate disabilities might be unlawful under the ADA but
might nevertheless be reasonable under the Equal Protection
jurisdictions also held that the ADA was not valid as applied to the states
before Kimel. See DeBose v. Nebraska, 186 F.3d 1087, 1088 (8th Cir. 1999);
Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1009-10 (8th Cir. 1999); Brown
v. N.C. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 166 F.3d 698, 708 (4th Cir. 1999); Hedgepeth
v. Tennessee, 33 F. Supp. 2d 668, 675 (W.D. Tenn. 1998); Nihiser v. Ohio
Envtl. Prot. Agency, 979 F. Supp. 1168, 1175-76 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 12202 (2002).
112. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. V. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
113. Id. at374.
114. Id. at 372-74.
115. Id. at370.
116. Id. (quoting id. at 379 (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
117. Id. at 370-74.
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Clause. 18 In consequence, the Court concluded that the ADA did
not validly abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity."
9
III. CONTRASTING DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INTERPRETATION OF STATE
DISABILITY PROTECTIONS
As Justice Brandeis noted, the states can and often do serve as
laboratories for the development of new solutions to common legal
problems. 12 In view of current retrenchments at the federal level, it
may be useful to take solace in more encouraging developments at
the state level, with the thought that successful state experiments
may eventually reinvigorate federal law. This Part will explore state
treatment of three issues as to which disability advocates argue that
federal law has failed adequately to protect the rights of persons with
disabilities: (1) the requirement of a substantial impairment of a
major life activity, (2) the requirement that mitigating measures be
considered when determining if someone is disabled, and (3) the use
of the interactive process in deciding on reasonable accommodations.
A. Substantial Impairment of a Major Life Activity
1. Federal law
The first area to consider is the definition of disability as
requiring a substantial impairment of a major life activity. In 2002,
the U.S. Supreme Court again addressed the issue of what constitutes
a major life activity for purposes of the definition of "disability."
'1 21
This issue had been addressed in a famous Rehabilitation Act case (a
7-2 Supreme Court decision in 1987), School Board v. Arline.
22
Arline was an elementary school teacher discharged after suffering a
118. Id. at 372-74 (The ADA "makes unlawful a range of alternative
responses that would be reasonable but would fall short of imposing an 'undue
burden' upon the employer.")
119. Id. at 372-76. But see Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004) (Two
persons who used wheelchairs for mobility were forced to crawl up the steps of
a state courthouse to enter. The Court ruled 5-4 that Congress can more easily
authorize suits against state governments when the case involves a
fundamental right such as accessing the court.).
120. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310-11 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
121. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
122. Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
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third relapse of tuberculosis in two years.1 23 She sued under Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act.' 24 The Supreme Court found that
Arline had a disability. 25 The Court, led by Justice Brennan, looked
to the intent of Congress to interpret the statute.' 26 Justice Brennan
began with Senator Humphrey's statements in the legislative history
of the Act, describing the broad goals of achieving equal
opportunities for people with disabilities. 127 Justice Brennan then
noted that the Act "reflected Congress'[s] concern with protecting
the handicapped against discrimination stemming not only from
simple prejudice, but also from 'archaic attitudes and laws."",
128
Justice Brennan also relied on the regulations the responsible federal
agencies promulgated, finding them to be "of significant
assistance"' 29 and "'an important source of guidance on the meaning
of § 504.
' ' 130
The Court identified two separate issues: (1) whether Arline had
a disability and (2) whether she was qualified to perform the
essential functions of her job without posing a direct threat to
others.1 3 1 The direct threat defense affected only her qualifications,
not whether she had a disability. This approach led to a broad view
of the definition of disability. 32 Because tuberculosis affects the
respiratory system and requires hospitalization, the majority found it
substantially limited major life activities. 33 The Supreme Court
suggested that contagiousness alone may be enough to justify
treating a disease as an impairment.' 34 Justice Brennan stated that
allowing discrimination because of "contagious effects of a physical
impairment would be inconsistent with the basic purpose of § 504,
123. Id. at 276.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 281.
126. Id. at 277-80.
127. Id. at 277 (citing 123 CONG. REc. 13,515 (1977)) (statement of Sen.
Humphrey).
128. Id. at 279.
129. Id.
130. Id. (quoting Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 304 n.24 (1985)).
131. Id. at 275, 280, 287.
132. See Wendy E. Parmet, Plain Meaning and Mitigating Measures:
Judicial Interpretations of the Meaning of Disability, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 53 (2000).
133. Arline, 480 U.S. at 281.
134. See id. at 282.
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which is to ensure that handicapped individuals are not denied jobs
or other benefits because of the prejudiced attitudes or the ignorance
of others."'
' 35
Justice Brennan's opinion rejected the idea that people with
disabilities are fundamentally different from general society.
136
Instead, it reflected a social understanding of disability-the notion
that social attitudes, rather than physical impairments, cause
individuals with disabilities to be treated differently.' 37  Justice
Brennan's opinion tries to remove the effects of those social attitudes
to allow people with disabilities to be a part of a collective whole,
rather than a fundamentally separate group.1
38
The dissenters, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, tried
to meld the two definitional issues of disability and qualification.
The dissent contended that because Arline was contagious, she was a
direct threat to her students/coworkers. 139 According to the dissent,
as a direct threat, Arline was not qualified to perform the job, and
was thus not a person with a disability.140 This construction would
benefit state actors, as defendants, because the question of whether
the plaintiff is a person with a disability presents a question of law
amenable to disposition on summary judgment, whereas the question
of whether a particular individual is qualified for a particular job
presents a question of fact less amenable to summary judgment.
Qualification mandates a factual inquiry into the essential functions
of the job, whether the employee can perform those essential
functions, whether the employee poses a threat to others, and
whether reasonable accommodations would permit the employee to
do the job and/or eliminate the threat.'
4 1
The dissent's approach skips much of the factual analysis and
allows stereotypes and fear to keep people out of work unnecessarily.
This struggle between those Justices who want to make disability
135. Id. at 284.
136. See id. at 282-86.
137. See id. at 283.
138. See id. at 273-79.
139. Id. at 291 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 291-92 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
141. It is interesting to note that on remand, Arline prevailed because she
was no longer contagious at the time of her discharge and was therefore
qualified to work as a teacher. Arline v. Sch. Bd., 692 F. Supp. 1286 (M.D.
Fla. 1988).
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rights coverage a summary judgment issue and those who demand a
full factual analysis continues in the Court's current disability
definition jurisprudence.
In 2002, only one of the original Arline majority remained on
the Court-Justice O'Connor. As her opinions in the Sutton trilogy
demonstrate discussed below, she narrowed her view of the
definition of disability since the 1987 Arline decision. Justice
O'Connor delivered the Toyota opinion for a unanimous Court on
January 8, 2002.142
In that case, the plaintiff, Williams, had carpal tunnel syndrome
that prevented her from lifting more than twenty pounds, working
with her arms raised, and doing repetitive wrist or elbow
movements. 143 Her work included paint inspection and assembly
inspection at a Toyota factory. 144 Toyota added body auditing and
surface repair to Williams's job.145 To perform these tasks, Williams
had to wipe the cars by holding her arms at shoulder height for
several hours at a time.146 Her carpal tunnel syndrome bothered her,
and she requested to be reassigned to paint and assembly inspection,
but Toyota refused. 147 Instead, Williams was placed under a no-
work restriction and fired. 1
48
The district court granted summary judgment to Toyota, holding
that Williams was not disabled as a matter of law. 149 The district
court held that gardening, housework, and playing with children did
not constitute major life activities. 150  They found insufficient
evidence of limits on lifting or working because she could do other
assembly jobs (paint and auto inspection).'51 The Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed and ordered summary judgment for Williams,
holding that she was substantially limited in the major life activity of
performing manual tasks.
52
142. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 184.
143. Id. at 187-88.
144. Id. at 188.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 189.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 190.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 191.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 191-92.
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The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Sixth Circuit,
finding that Williams could not be considered disabled as a matter of
law on summary judgment.'5 3 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court did
not decide the issue of Williams's alleged disability but remanded it
to the district court.'
54
The Court noted that the ADA protects individuals who are
substantially limited in one or more major life activities., 55 Williams
alleged that performing manual tasks was the major life activity at
issue in her case. 156 Justice O'Connor found that a person is disabled
in the major life activity of performing manual tasks only if she is
substantially limited in activities that are of "central importance to
most people's daily lives." 157 The Supreme Court's analysis did not
give any greater importance to work-related manual tasks than to
home-related tasks, even though the case arose in a work-related
context. The Court explicitly compared working with brushing teeth
in terms of their significance to its analysis.'
5 8
The Toyota opinion included a qualitative assessment of the
importance of the tasks at issue by noting that they were "of central
importance."'' 5 9  Also, the opinion focused on an objective
perspective ("most people's"), rather than the importance of the task
to the individual at issue.160 The Toyota Court adopted Justice
Rehnquist's quantitative analysis requiring activities to occur
frequently or daily, at least in the context of the major life activity of
performing manual tasks.'
6 1
Notably, the Court did not focus to any extent on the legislative
history or the opinions of the enforcing federal agency. Instead, the
Justices' decision was "guided first and foremost by the words of the
disability definition itself' and by the dictionary definitions of
"substantial" and "major."' 62 This clearly exemplifies a strict textual
approach to statutory interpretation. The Court stated that "these
153. Id. at 202-03.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 197.
156. Id. at 190.
157. Id. at 198.
158. Id. at 202.
159. Id. at 198.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 201.
162. Id. at 196-97.
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terms need to be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard
for qualifying as disabled," relying on the ADA's note that 43
million people had disabilities in the United States. 16 3 The Court,
therefore, held that, to be a substantial limitation, an impairment
must "prevent[] or severely restrict[]" the individual's performance
of major life activities.164
On its face, the Toyota opinion deals solely with the major life
activity of performing manual tasks. Congress, itself, defined
performing manual tasks as a major life activity.1 65 However, by
holding in essence that only major manual tasks constitute major life
activities, the Toyota Court added a new limitation. There are
reasons to suppose Toyota may be limited to the activity of manual
tasks. The case addressed a disability--carpal tunnel syndrome-
about which our society (and our courts) have mixed, and often
negative, feelings-with many people doubting the seriousness of
the disorder. Thus, courts may take a more lenient view in other
cases.
The Court's decision in Toyota indicates a further restriction of
its approach to substantial limitation. The Court admonished the
district court to assess what the plaintiff can do and to weigh this
assessment against what she cannot do. 166 Only if the impossible
tasks outweigh or outnumber the possible ones will the plaintiff be
substantially limited in performing manual tasks. 16 7 This approach,
in effect, may require plaintiffs to show that they are nearly unable to
perform a major life activity, rather than simply being limited. This
approach would conflict with the statutory language calling for
assessment of the limitations, not the capabilities of the person with a
disability.
Again, looking beneath the actual text of the opinion to
determine the driving force behind this cutback of civil rights for
persons with disabilities, it appears that three primary underlying
163. Id. at 197. The Court has relied on this number repeatedly to justify
narrow coverage. See US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 404-05
(2002); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 370 (2001);
Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 484 (1999). The legislature, itself,
apparently believed 43 million was a large number, justifying broad coverage.
164. Toyota, 534 US.. at 198.
165. Id. at 197-98.
166. Id. at 200-02.
167. Id.
1088
DISABILITY RIGHTS
reasons exist. First, as mentioned above, carpal tunnel syndrome is
viewed with suspicion. Many people do not understand the medical
nature of the problem. Second, concern exists over the broad reach
of the ADA if carpal tunnel syndrome qualifies as a protected
disability. Finally, if someone with carpal tunnel syndrome is
considered "disabled," the distinction between "them" and "us"
becomes blurred. This is because people with carpal tunnel
syndrome are not natural objects of pity, so charity does not appear
to fit. In fact, even a "normal" person could have carpal tunnel
syndrome. Thus, the need to separate people with disabilities into a
segregated and pitiable group is self-evident from the Court's
decision.
Although many states enacted anti-discrimination protections for
persons with disabilities in their laws prior to the passage of the
ADA, many of those states amended their statutes to follow the
federal definition in the early 1990s. 168 Still, some states have kept
additional protection as discussed below. In fact, it is interesting to
note that at least six states have passed laws prohibiting
discrimination in employment based on genetic testing, including
Arizona, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, and Wisconsin.
1 69
2. California
In California, the Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA")
merely requires that the physical disability "limit" a major life
activity,170 as opposed to the ADA, which requires that the physical
disability "substantially limit[]" a major life activity. 17 1  The
California law also includes a broad definition of "physical
disability."'172 In early cases, the courts found that the FEHA covers
many types of disabilities. For example, in American National
Insurance Co. v. Fair Employment and Housing Commission,173 the
California Supreme Court found that the FEHA covered high blood
168. See Center & Imparato, supra note 2, at 334.
169. See infra app. Not surprisingly, these states are also more likely to
provide more protection for persons with disabilities.
170. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 12900-12995 (West 1992 & Supp. 2004).
171. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000)(emphasis added).
172. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12926(h).
173. Am. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 651 P.2d
1151 (1982).
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pressure that would pose a risk of future disability. 174 Indeed, a
unanimous California Supreme Court held clearly, in Colmenares v.
Braemar Country Club, Inc.,175 that the FEHA requires a physical
condition merely to limit, not to substantially limit, participation in
major life activities. 
176
The California Supreme Court in Colmenares reversed the
decision of the lower court that the federal standard applied.
Colmenares had worked for Braemar since 1972.177 In 1981, he
injured his back at work and was assigned to light duty.178 In 1982,
Colmenares was promoted to foreman and received positive work
reviews until 1995.179 At that point, a new supervisor began giving
him unfavorable performance reviews. 180  He was terminated in
1997. 81 The lower court granted summary judgment for Braemar
because Colmenares had stipulated that he did not meet the federal
standard of "substantially limited in a major life activity" but argued
that he did meet the California standard. 182 The California Supreme
Court remanded the case for review as to whether any other ground
for summary judgment could be sustained. 183  Unfortunately for
Colmenares, on remand the Court of Appeal, in an unpublished
decision, found that even assuming he was a qualified individual
with a disability, he was terminated for a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason.' 
84
3. Florida
The Florida statute does not include a specific definition of
disability. However, the administrative agencies in Florida have
developed a subjective test that generally provides more protection
than the ADA. In Johnson v. ITT Thompson Industries, Metal
174. Id. at 1155.
175. Colmenares v. Braemar Country Club, Inc., 29 Cal. 4th 1019, 63
P.3d 220, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 662 (2003).
176. Colmenares, 29 Cal. 4th at 1031.
177. Id. at 1023.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1024.
183. Id. at 1031.
184. Colmenares v. Braemar Country Club, No. B142962, 2003 Cal. App.
Unpub. LEXIS 7854 (Aug. 19, 2003).
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Division,18 5 the agency defined a person with a disability as someone
who "'does not enjoy, in some manner, the full and normal use of his
sensory, mental or physical faculties.""186 This has been held to
protect persons with impairments such as obesity' 87  and
asbestosis.
88
4. Vermont
Vermont's disability statute includes the ADA language of
substantially limiting one or more major life activities, but also sets
forth a list of impairments that automatically qualify as disabilities.
The Vermont statute lists cerebral palsy, epilepsy, cancer, heart
disease, diabetes, alcoholism, multiple sclerosis, and muscular
dystrophy as protected disabilities, removing the need for individual
analysis. 8 9 This is significant, as many of these conditions may not
qualify as a substantial impairment under the federal interpretation.
5. New Jersey
The state of New Jersey also has an extensive list of presumed
disabilities. 190 This list includes some disabilities that federal law
most likely does not protect, such as: "any degree of paralysis,
amputation, lack of physical coordination [, and] physical reliance on
a service or guide dog, wheelchair or other remedial ... device."'
91
In addition, the statute includes a subjective catchall clause that
covers any "physical disability, infirmity, malformation or
disfigurement''92 with no mention of a substantial limitation
requirement.
185. Johnson v. ITT Thompson Indus., Metal Div., No. 88-0110, 1988 Fla.
Div. Adm. Hear. LEXIS 4240 (Fla. Div. Admin. Hearings Feb. 6, 1989).
186. Id. at*10.
187. See Harvey v. Alachua County Bd. of Comm'rs, No. 89-1548, 1989
Fla. Div. Adm. Hear. LEXIS 6838 (Fla. Div. Admin. Hearings Jan. 16, 1990).
188. See Brand v. Fla. Power Corp., 633 So. 2d 504 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1994). But see Solomon v. Dep't. of Transp., 541 So. 2d 691 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1989).
189. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495d(7)(c) (1987).
190. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(q) (West 2002).
191. Id.
192. Id.
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6. Maryland
Maryland's statute is very similar to New Jersey's. It also
contains an extensive list of presumed disabilities and a very broad
catchall provision.'
93
7. New York
Arguably, New York has the broadest and most protective state
statute. The New York law protects an employee with any physical
or mental impairment that prevents the exercise of normal bodily
functions or is demonstrated by medically accepted clinical or
laboratory diagnostic techniques. 194 In Reeves v. Johnson Controls
World Services, Inc.,195 the court found that an air operations
supervisor who had panic disorder with agoraphobia was disabled
under New York law even though he would not be so considered
under federal law.
8. Washington
In McClarty v. Totem Electric,196 the court held that McClarty
correctly argued that he presented factual evidence in the form of a
doctor's release indicating he suffered from bilateral carpal tunnel
syndrome. This evidence satisfied the state statute's physical
abnormality requirement. 197 In footnote 7, the court stated:
Totem points out that the United States Supreme Court
recently determined that, under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, carpal tunnel syndrome, as a matter of law,
is not a disability that substantially limits an employee's
major life activity of working, citing Toyota Motor
Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184
(2002) (citations omitted). The Pulcino test contemplates
only those activities that interfere with the employee's job
performance, whereas the Americans with Disabilities Act
considers physical impairments in the context of a person's
major life activities, not just work. 42 U.S.C.
193. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49(B), § 15(g) (1957).
194. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(21) (McKinney 2001 & Supp. 2004).
195. Reeves v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 104 F.3d 144 (2d Cir.
1997).
196. McClarty v. Totem Elec., 81 P.3d 901 (2003).
197. See id. at 908.
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§ 12102(2)(A). Thus, it is easier to establish substantial
limitation under the WLAD than under the ADA.
198
Washington Courts have also held that a person who has sensitivity
to secondhand smoke is covered under state law.
199
9. Connecticut
In an unpublished decision, the court held that a genuine issue of
fact existed as to whether carpal tunnel syndrome qualified as a
disability.200 People's Bank contended that the court should look to
the ADA to determine whether Christophe had a "disability" and
argued that according to federal precedent, carpal tunnel syndrome
was not a "disability" unless it substantially limited an employee
from performing a major life activity.20 ' Christophe countered that
carpal tunnel syndrome has been included within the term "physical
disability" under Connecticut law.20 2 She brought her case under
General Statutes of Connecticut § 46a-60.2 °3
The court found that, unlike the ADA, the Connecticut statute
does not define a disability in terms of whether it substantially limits
a major life activity. 2°4 "Moreover, although our Supreme Court has
not addressed the issue specifically, our trial courts have held that
carpal tunnel syndrome can be a physical disability under § 46a-60,
particularly when the condition is chronic." 20 5 In footnote 6, the
198. Id. at 908 n.7.
199. Hinman v. Yakima Sch. Dist., 850 P.2d 536 (Wash. App. 1993).
200. Christophe v. People's Bank, No. 385621, 2003 Conn. Super. LEXIS
1086, at * 15 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 19, 2003).
201. Id. at *11-'12.202. Id. at * 12.
203. Id.
204. Id. at *12-*13.
205. Id. The court referred to many lower court decisions. See Farahani v.
State, No. CV010809033S, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2337, at *3 (Conn.
Super. Ct. July 9, 2002) (finding carpal tunnel syndrome qualifies as a physical
disability under § 46a-51); Infante v. Thomas, No. CV970395925S, 2001
Conn. Super. LEXIS 1726, at *9-*10 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 20, 2001)
(holding carpal tunnel syndrome is a physical disability for purposes of the
ADA and § 46a-60); Gilman Bros. Co. v. Conn. Comm'n on Human Rights
and Opportunities, No. CV950536075, 1997 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1311, at
* 14-*16 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 13, 1997) (upholding Connecticut
Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities ("CHRO") decision that
chronic carpal tunnel syndrome is a physical disability under § 46a-51(15));
Gen. Dynamics, Corp. v. Comm'n on Human Rights and Opportunities, No.
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court observed, "While our courts have often looked to federal
employment discrimination law for guidance in enforcing our own
anti-discrimination statutes 'we have also recognized that, under
certain circumstances, federal law defines the beginning and not the
end of our approach to the subject.'
20 6
10. Texas
In Texas, the definition of "disability" tracks that of the federal
ADA. However, in a 2002 case, a Texas court found that carpal
tunnel syndrome could be a protected disability. In Haggar Apparel
Co. v. Leal,20 7 that court determined that the jury had before it
sufficient evidence to conclude that disability discrimination was a
motivating factor in Haggar's decision to terminate Leal. 20 8 "Based
on the evidence, 20 9 a reasonable jury could have concluded that
524412, 1993 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1984, at *13, *23 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 6,
1993) (upholding a CHRO decision in which, at trial, parties agreed carpal
tunnel syndrome is a disability according to § 46a-51(15)).
206. Christophe, 2003 Conn. Super. LEXIS, at *14 n.6 (quoting State v.
Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities, 559 A.2d 1120, 1124 (Conn.
1989) (citations omitted)(internal quotation marks omitted)).
207. Haggar Apparel Co. v. Leal, 100 S.W.3d 303 (Tex. App. 2002).
208. Id. at 308.
209. The evidence showed:
Leal worked for Haggar from 1979 until 1994 performing repetitive
assembly-line work. In 1983, she was first diagnosed with carpel
tunnel syndrome, which was successfully treated with surgery. Leal
suffered a recurrence of this condition in 1993. Leal underwent
substantial medical treatment and was generally given somewhat
modified duties at Haggar. In the spring and summer, two of her
treating doctors concluded that she had reached maximum medical
improvement and that she suffered a medical impairment or partial
permanent disability. These physicians recommended surgery or
continued modified duties, in one instance "for the rest of her life."
Less than three months later, Haggar terminated Leal for alleged
violations of its absenteeism policy. Leal testified that while she was
working for Haggar, her supervisors told her that she "was to leave the
place for somebody else that was younger, because the ball of years on
my back was getting [too] heavy for me to be working there any
more," that it "was probably arthritis, rheumatism, since [she] was too
old to perform any more." Leal testified that she asked why she had
been terminated, and Bill Pitchford, the plant manager, told her that
"It's too much, like this injury, supposedly you say that you hurt and
this and that, it's going on too long. We cannot keep people like you
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Haggar believed that Leal had a substantially limiting impairment
that she did not have or that she had a substantially limiting
impairment when, in fact, the impairment was not so limiting."
210
11. West Virginia
In Stone v. St. Joseph's Hospital,211 a paramedic with a back
strain sued his employer because the latter temporarily moved him
from his regular job to a dispatcher job until more information about
his injury could be discovered.212 Since he received the same pay,
the court ultimately held that this was not disability discrimination; it
did, however, find that he was a person with a disability under the
state law.21 3 The court noted several areas where West Virginia and
federal law diverge.214 In footnote 21, the court cited the following
cases:
It should also be noted that differences between our
developing disability discrimination jurisprudence and
federal jurisprudence already appear to have developed in
several areas. Compare, e.g., Benjamin R. v. Orkin
Exterminating Co., 390 S.E.2d 814 ([W. Va.] 1990) (a
person with asymptomatic HIV infection is a person with a
disability who has standing to invoke disability
discrimination laws) (citation omitted) with Runnebaum v.
NationsBank, 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 1997) (a person with
asymptomatic HIV infection does not have protected status
to invoke discrimination laws) and with Bragdon v. Abbott,
524 U.S. 624 (1998) (some persons with asymptomatic HIV
infection may be able to invoke the protection of disability
discrimination laws) (citations omitted); compare also
Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 284 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating
that in the Fourth Circuit, reassignment to a vacant position
is not a form of reasonable accommodation) with Syllabus
around." At trial, Pitchford directly testified that he would not rehire
Leal "[a]ssuming that she could not do a ten hour workday."
Id. at 310-11.
210. Id. at311.
211. Stone v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 538 S.E.2d 389 (W. Va. 2000).
212. Id. at 393-94.
213. Id. at 407-08.
214. Id. at 404.
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Point 4 of Skaggs v. Elk Run Coal Co., Inc., 479 S.E.2d
561, ([W. Va.] 1996) (Justice Cleckley writing for the
Court, holding that reassignment to a vacant position may in
a given case be a form of reasonable accommodation)
(citation omitted); compare also Haynes v. Rhone-Poulenc,
521 S.E.2d 331 ([W. Va.] 1999) (holding that a temporarily
totally disabled person may invoke protection under
disability discrimination laws) (citation omitted) with
McDonald v. Pennsylvania, 62 F.3d 92 (3d Cir. 1995) (a
nurse recovering from abdominal surgery was held not able
to invoke the ADA, because her inability to work was not
permanent).215
Therefore, the court held, "[b]ased on the foregoing discussion,
we recognize that the West Virginia Human Rights Act, as created
by our Legislature and as applied by our courts and administrative
agencies, represents an independent approach to the law of disability
discrimination that is not mechanically tied to federal disability
discrimination jurisprudence., 216  Interestingly, the West Virginia
court looked at the laws in other states to bolster its holding. The
court found cases from Maryland, Wisconsin, Colorado, Ohio,
Illinois, Louisiana, California, and Iowa, as well as one First Circuit
federal court case, helpful to support its decision.
217
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. In support of its decision, the court noted:
In Office of Occupational Medicine v. Baltimore Community Relations
Commission, 594 A.2d 1237 ([Md.] 1991) (citation omitted), the court
held that a fire fighter job applicant could invoke the jurisdiction of
the state law against disability discrimination, when an employer
perceived him to have a possible future disability due to a bullet that
was lodged in his spine. The applicant was a military veteran who
was not actually impaired by the bullet. The court said that the finder
of fact could permissibly conclude that the employer had treated the
applicant as having a possible future impairment that could "impair
major life activities, e.g., earning a living."
Id. at 405 (quoting Office of Occupational Med. v. Balt. Cmty. Relations
Comm'n, 594 A.2d 1237, 1242 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991).
In footnote 23, the court continued:
[In] City of LaCrosse Police & Fire Commission v. Labor and
Industry Review Commission, 407 N.W.2d 510 ([Wis.] 1987) (citation
omitted), where a job applicant was denied eligibility for a job because
of perceived "back deficiencies which possibly would not permit him
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to perform physical duties required of a... police officer." Id. at 513.
The court held that the applicant, who had no actual physical
limitations, was nevertheless entitled to invoke the protections of state
law against "regarded as" disability discrimination. In Colorado Civil
Rights Commission v. N. Washington Fire Protection District, 772
P.2d 70 ([Colo.] 1989), the Colorado Supreme Court held that
applicants for firefighter positions could invoke the protection of state
law against disability discrimination. Some of the applicants had prior
orthopedic injuries that were not currently disabling, but which the
employer perceived as making the applicants ineligible. The Colorado
court said that "the District [claims that it] did not treat the applicants
as being substantially limited in one or more of their major life
activities, but rather as being limited only with regard to specific job-
related functions and risks of fighting fires. We find this argument
irrelevant to the question of whether an applicant is handicapped...
by virtue of an erroneous perception of handicap." Id. at 78. In City
of Cleveland v. Ohio Civil Rights Commission, 648 N.E.2d 516
([Ohio] 1994) (citation omitted), the employer argued that an aspiring
firefighter could not invoke the coverage of state law prohibiting
disability discrimination, where the firefighter had a congenital
malformation that prevented him from closing his right eyelid. The
employer argued that despite the fact that the employer viewed the
applicant's eye condition as a bar to the job, the employer did not view
the applicant's eye condition as a "handicap." The court rejected this
argument, holding that the employer's reliance on the perceived
disqualifying condition allowed the employee to invoke the law
against disability discrimination. See also AT & T Tech[s], Inc. v.
Royston, 772 P.2d 1182 (Colo. App. 1989) (under state law a person
who had a muscle strain in his back that caused him pain, required
him to avoid heavy lifting and carrying, and restricted the use of his
arms, was qualified to invoke the law against disability
discrimination); Cisco Trucking Co., Inc. v. Human Rights Comm 'n/],
653 N.E.2d 986 ([Ill. App. Ct.] 1995) (truck driver who had injured
his back and was laid off was permitted to invoke the protection of the
state disability discrimination law because the layoff was allegedly
based on a perceived physical handicap) (citation omitted); Turner v.
City of Monroe, 634 So.2d 981 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (an employee who
was treated as unable to return to his job as a signal technician
following back surgery, after his treating physician had given him a
clean bill of health, could invoke the protection of state law against
disability discrimination); Am[.] Nat[']l Ins[.] Co[] v. Fair
Employment and Hous[.] Comm[In, 32 Cal. 3d 603, 609, 651 P.2d
1151, 1155, 186 Cal. Rptr. 345, 349 (1982) ("The law clearly was
designed to prevent employers from acting arbitrarily against physical
conditions that, whether actually or potentially handicapping, may
present no current job disability or job-related health risk."); Howell v.
Merritt Co., 585 N.W.2d 278 (Iowa 1998) (it was a jury question
whether an employer terminated an employee in part because of a
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B. Mitigating Measures
The second issue is whether the determination of disability
should include the consideration of mitigating measures. In other
words, there is a question whether an insulin-dependent diabetic
would be considered disabled such that she would be protected by
the civil rights laws although her insulin shots keep her blood sugar
within safe limits.
1. Federal law
With regard to mitigating measures, the restrictions on the class
of persons entitled to protection under the ADA arose out of a series
of Supreme Court decisions: Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
21 8
Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,219 and Albertson 's, Inc. v.
Kirkingburg.220 These cases held that in determining whether an
individual is disabled for purposes of protection under the ADA,
mitigating measures must be taken into consideration.
22'
In Sutton, the Court explained that the determination of "whether
an individual is disabled should be made with reference to measures
that mitigate the individual's impairment."222  In this case, the
plaintiffs were twin sisters with uncorrected vision of 20/200 in one
eye and 20/400 in the other eye.223 With corrective lenses, their
vision was 20/20.224 The plaintiffs sought positions as pilots with
United Air Lines but were refused employment due to United's
perception of disability associated with her use of a TENS device for
back pain); Katz v. City Metal Co., Inc., 87 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 1996)
(applying state and federal law, holding that while it was a close
question whether the plaintiff was "actually disabled" by his heart
condition, he could invoke law against disability discrimination where
he showed that his employer treated him as having a substantially
limiting condition).
Id. at 405-06 n.23.
218. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
219. Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
220. Albertson's, Inc., v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
221. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475; Murphy, 527 U.S. at 521; Kirkingburg, 527
U.S. at 565-66.
222. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475 (emphasis added).
223. Id.
224. Id.
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policy requiring pilots to have uncorrected vision of 20/100 or better
in each eye.225 The plaintiffs sued under Title I of the ADA.226
The issues presented were whether the plaintiffs were
substantially limited in major life activities and whether the decision
should be based on their condition before or after their use of
corrective lenses (i.e., before or after their use of mitigating measures
taken to alleviate the ramifications of their visual impairments).
22 7
The only issue on appeal was the "substantial limitation" question;
the Court did not comment on the impairment question.228
The Supreme Court, in a 7-2 decision authored by Justice
O'Connor, affirmed the decision of the Tenth Circuit.229 In deciding
not to follow the EEOC's guidelines indicating that mitigating
measures should not be considered, the Court reasoned that no
agency had been delegated authority to interpret the term "disability"
under the ADA, because the term fell outside Titles I-V.230 The
Court found that Congress had not delegated authority to the EEOC
to promulgate regulations with respect to any term that was not
unique to Title 1.23 1 Therefore, the EEOC's guidance was not
entitled to judicial deference.232
The Court took an explicitly textual approach to the analysis of
the statute. The majority used the plain language rule of statutory
construction and found that the term "substantially limits" was not
ambiguous and, therefore, they need not look to secondary sources
such as legislative history.233 They relied solely on the plain
language of the statute and grammatical rules. They found that
"substantially limits" includes mitigating measures for the following
reasons:
225. Id. at 475-76.
226. See id. at 476.
227. See id. at 481.
228. See id. at 481-82.
229. Id. at 494.
230. Id. at 479.
231. Id.
232. Id. However, the Court has continued to cite other aspects of the
EEOC's definition of disability, such as its definition of the major life activity
of "working." It has not explained why it should give deference to some, but
not all, of EEOC's regulations with respect to the term "individual with a
disability." Id. at 480.
233. Id. at 482.
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a) The use of the present indicative form of the verb
"limits" indicates assessment of the current state of the
limitation, not potential or hypothetical state;
234
b) The requirement of an individualized inquiry requires
assessment of the actual limit on this person, not the general
limits;
235
c) As a matter of public policy, courts and employers
should not be asked to speculate about hypothetical effects
of impairments.236
Even assuming the majority were to look at congressional intent,
the Court found that the legislative intent indicated that not all
persons who use glasses should be covered.237 The Court relied upon
the statutory language stating that there are 43 million people with
disabilities in the United States. 238 Accordingly, the Court concluded
that if everyone who wore glasses were included, the figure would
have been much higher.239
Justices Stevens and Breyer in their dissent took an intentionalist
approach, modeled after Justice Brennan's opinion in School Board
of Nassau County v. Arline.240 The dissent argued that the majority's
interpretation reached a "bizarre result;" it would penalize people for
trying to overcome their physical and mental limitations.2 4 1 Under
the majority approach, a person with controlled epilepsy or diabetes
could be fired because of their impairment, but could not seek
redress because they are not disabled enough.242 Moreover, people
with such impairments could be denied the reasonable
accommodations they need to maintain control of their impairments
(e.g., regular meal breaks or time to test blood) because they are not
considered disabled. The denial of accommodations could lead to
234. Id.
235. Id. at 483 (citing Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
236. Id. at 483-84.
237. Id. at 484.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 487. The fact of the matter is that Congress did not engage in any
real fact-finding with regard to that figure. See id. at 484.
240. Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
241. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 499 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
242. Id. at 509-10 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1100
DISABILITY RIGHTS
the loss of control of the disease, making a person unqualified to
perform a job.243
The dissenters interpreted the language in light of the statute's
stated purpose to provide a "clear and comprehensive national
mandate.",244 They also relied on the opinion of the agency charged
with interpreting and enforcing the law, finding that the EEOC's
interpretation was consistent with the statute's purpose. 245 "[E]ach
of the three Executive agencies charged with implementing the Act
ha[d] consistently interpreted the Act as mandating that the presence
of disability turns on an individual's uncorrected state., 246 They also
found support for the EEOC's interpretation in the legislative
hist'ry.247 For example, the Senate Report from which the ADA
originated states that "'whether a person has a disability should be
assessed without regard to the availability of mitigating measures,
such as reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids."' 248  The
history refers repeatedly to correctable impairments such as epilepsy
and diabetes.249
The majority and dissenting opinions in this case set out most
clearly the distinction between intentionalist (Stevens) and textualist
(O'Connor) approaches. Today, we are witnessing the "bizarre"
results the dissent predicted.. It is nearly impossible to succeed in an
ADA case if one has epilepsy, diabetes, or depression, because if
medication mitigates the problem, one is not disabled. If medication
does not work, one is not qualified because one cannot do the job.
In Kirkingburg, the plaintiff had amblyopia, an uncorrectable
condition that leaves him with 20/200 vision in his left eye, and
20/20 correctable vision in his right eye.250 Because he only used his
right eye to see, he had monocular vision.25 1 Albertson's, a grocery
chain, fired Kirkingburg from his job as a truck driver after
243. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
244. Id. at 496-97 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
245. Id. at 502-03 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
246. Id. at 501 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Eight of the nine Federal Courts of
Appeals that had ruled on this issue had agreed with the EEOC. Id. at 495-96
& n. 1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
247. Id. at 497, 502 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
248. Id. at 499 (Stevens, J., dissenting)(citations omitted).
249. See id. at 500 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
250. Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 559 (1999).
251. Id.
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determining that he could not meet its vision standard.252
Kirkingburg sued Albertson's under the ADA. 53 The trial court
granted summary judgment for the defendant-employer, and a
divided panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed.254 The Ninth Circuit
found that Kirkingburg was disabled because his vision was
effectively monocular and that "'the manner in which he sees differs
significantly from the manner in which most people see."'
255
The issue presented to the Supreme Court was whether the lower
court's determination that Kirkingburg was an individual with a
disability was correct. 256  In overruling the Ninth Circuit's
determination that Kirkingburg was "an individual with a disability"
the Supreme Court criticized two key aspects of the Ninth Circuit's
analysis.257
First, the Court found that the Ninth Circuit did not use a
sufficiently rigorous "substantial limitation" requirement.258 While
noting that a substantial limitation does not have to rise to the level
of an utter inability, the Court nonetheless found that a showing of a
"mere difference" is not sufficient to meet this requirement. 259 The
Court held that Kirkingburg had shown that he saw "differently"
from the rest of the population, but had not shown that that different
method of seeing constituted a substantial limitation of the ability to
see.
260
Second, based on the Sutton decision, the Court held that
Kirkingburg's limitations should be considered in light of mitigating
measures. 26  In this case, those measures were self-corrective.
"'[T]he individual had learned to compensate for the disability by
making subconscious adjustments to the manner in which he sensed
depth and perceived peripheral objects."'' 262 Thus, self-correcting
252. Id. at 560.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 561.
255. Id. (quoting Kirkingburg v. Albertson's, Inc., 143 F.3d 1228, 1232 (9th
Cir. 1998)).
256. See id. at 563.
257. Id. at 562.
258. Id. at 565.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 565-66.
262. Id. at 565 (quoting Kirkingburg v. Albertson's, Inc., 143 F.3d 1228,
1232 (9th Cir. 1998)).
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measures must be considered in assessing the substantiality of a
limitation. The Court stated: "We see no principled basis for
distinguishing between measures undertaken with artificial aids, like
medications and devices, and measures undertaken, whether
consciously or not, with the body's own systems. 263 The Court here
further expanded the "mitigating measure" rule.
264
These decisions illustrate how the Court uses a textualist
approach to define people with disabilities as fundamentally distinct
from the general population-in other words, to define them as the
"natural objects of pity." Underlying each of these decisions is the
Court's stated fear that if these people have disabilities, then there
are many people who have disabilities. The Court prefers to see
people with disabilities as a small class of people who bear little
resemblance to the Justices themselves. These special people will be
entitled to legal protection, not because such protection is fair or
addresses a historical wrong as a matter of civil rights, but because
these people need extra help. Thus, the Court treats civil rights
protection as charity, to be given only to those who cannot help
themselves.
Mitigating measures can include visual aids, medicines, medical
devices, and even natural responses of the body that compensate for
a physical or mental impairment.265 In the wake of Sutton, many
courts have construed state laws protecting disabled individuals to
require the consideration of mitigating measures in making disability
266determinations. Unfortunately, consideration of mitigating
measures often strips individuals with disabilities of protections
they may have otherwise had under their state disability laws.
However, some states continue to refuse to consider mitigating
measures under state statutes, even under the federal mandate of
Sutton as applied to the ADA.
In this section, I examine state court opinions issued after the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Sutton, including cases
from California, Michigan, Minnesota, District of Columbia,
263. Id. at 565-66.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
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Tennessee, Texas, Louisiana, and Massachusetts.267 Some of these
cases demonstrate that the state experiment is still working, while
others show that federal decisions have stifled experimentation and
evolution.
2. California
California protects disabled individuals under the FEHA.2 68 The
FEHA defines a "physical disability" as a "physiological
disease, disorder, condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical
loss" that both affects a body system and limits a major life
activity. 269 The FEHA also incorporates by reference the ADA
definition of "disability" in the event that its alternative definition
would provide an individual with broader protection.
270
The FEHA was amended to include a new section specifying
that "'[1]imits' shall be determined without regard to mitigating
measures such as medications, assistive devices, prosthetics, or
reasonable accommodations, unless the mitigating measure itself
limits a major life activity." 271 It seems that the California statute
may indeed have the effect of providing broader protection in this
respect, although this specific issue does not yet appear to have been
ruled on in California post-Sutton. However, a California appellate
court has recognized, without passing judgment on the issue, that
the FEHA specifies:
The law of this state in the area of disabilities provides
protections independent from those in the federal
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. Although the
federal act provides a floor of protection, this state's law
has always, even prior to passage of the federal act,
afforded additional protections.272
To be sure, even in the post-Sutton era, not all disability
claims brought under the FEHA have failed for lack of a finding
267. This article does not purport to provide an exhaustive review of all state
case law.
268. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12900-12995 (West 1992 & Supp. 2004).
269. Id. § 12926(k)(1).
270. Id. § 12926(1).
271. Id. § 12926(k)(1)(B)(i) (emphasis added).
272. Id. § 12926.1(a) (citation omitted).
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of "disability." This has been so even in the presence of
mitigating measures.
In Rebhan v. Atoll Holdings, Inc.,2 7 3 Rebhan, an insulin-
dependent diabetic, had worked in the accounting department at
Escorp for nine years. 274 Because of her impairment, she had to
test her blood sugar level several times a day, inject insulin three
times daily, and follow a strict diet and exercise plan.275 She also
suffered from diabetic hypoglycemia, a common side effect of
insulin in which the blood sugar level drops too low. 276 Effects of
diabetic hypoglycemia include answering questions slowly or
inappropriately, staring off into space, losing concentration,
experiencing lapses in memory, and possibly even losing
consciousness.277 During her nine years at Escorp, Rebhan had
experienced such insulin reactions while at work, as often as once
per month according to her supervisor.278  After company-wide
layoffs at Escorp, Rebhan was assigned the additional responsibility
of acting as Escorp's receptionist. 279 One day, while answering the
telephones, she experienced a severe insulin reaction and lost
consciousness. 280  The incident resulted in Rebhan receiving a
written warning, which placed her "on 'notice that the next time
[she was] unable to perform [her] duties as [a] receptionist, due to
[her] having a diabetic episode where [she fell] into a catatonic
state, [Escorp would] be forced at that time to terminate [her]
employment.' 28 1 Seven months later, she had an insulin reaction
282during which she lost consciousness. When it happened, she
was working at her desk in the accounting department and was not
at the receptionist station answering phones. Nevertheless, Escorp
terminated her at the end of the day because of the incident.283
273. Rebhan v. Atoll Holdings, Inc., No. B140612, 2001 Cal. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 244 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2001).
274. Id. at *2.
275. Id. at *3.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. at *4.
279. Id. at *2.
280. Id. at *4.
281. Id. at *5.
282. Id.
283. Id. at *6.
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The trial court initially found that Rebhan had been unlawfully
terminated based on her disability by concluding that Sutton did not
apply to the FEHA and that Rebhan had a disability when
evaluated in her unmitigated state.284 On appeal, the court noted
the discrepancy between the Sutton requirements to consider
mitigating measures under the ADA, and the FEHA's explicit
requirement that mitigating measures not be considered.285
However, the court did not resolve the discrepancy or even opine on
the issue.286 Rather, the court distinguished the case from Sutton by
finding that Rebhan, even in her medicated condition, was limited in
a major life activity (apparently applying the more lenient FEHA
standard of "limited" vs. "substantially limited").287 Thus, Rebhan
ultimately prevailed in her FEHA discrimination claim against
Escorp for her wrongful termination.
288
In Christensen v. City of Los Angeles,289 on the other hand, the
FEHA plaintiff was not successful.290 Christensen was an amputee
who had lost'his left leg below the knee shortly after birth.291 As a
result, he had worn a prosthetic leg almost his entire life.292 With
his prosthetic, Christensen was able to run and play softball and
baseball.293  Additionally, even without his prosthetic, he could
ski.294
When Christensen applied to become a police officer with the
City of Los Angeles, he passed an initial battery of tests and
received a provisional offer contingent upon successful completion
of a medical evaluation. 295 Unfortunately, he did not pass that
evaluation because he was found to have a medical condition, which
"'either limit[ed his] ability to perform an essential job task or
284. Id.
285. Id. at *8-*9.
286. See id. at *9.
287. Id. at *10-* L
288. Id. at*l-*2.
289. Christensen v. City of L.A., No. B149031, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 1680 (Cal. Ct. App. May 30, 2002).
290. Id. at *2.
291. Id. at *2-*3.
292. Id. at *3.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. at *3-*4.
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which would create a direct risk of harm if [he] were employed in
the... job [applied for].'
' 296
Christensen filed suit for unlawful discrimination based on
disability in violation of the FEHA.297 The court found that he was
not covered by the FEHA because, "by his own admission, he [was]
capable of participating in major life activities" and therefore did not
have a protected physical disability as defined by the FEHA.298
While it may seem that the court must have considered
Christensen's mitigating measure (his prosthesis) in its disability
determination, which would be against the proscription of the
FEHA, that may not have actually happened. Christensen had
admitted that he was able to ski without his prosthesis. 299 On the
other hand, his ability to ski was facilitated by modified skis
including a single ski with outriggers. 300 Apparently, either such a
device is not considered a mitigating measure, or the court did
consider mitigating measures in its decision.
3. Michigan
Michigan protects disabled individuals under its Persons with
Disabilities Civil Rights Act.30' Its definition of "disability" is
302similar to that of the ADA. However, since Sutton the issue of
whether or not mitigating measures should be considered in making
disability determinations under the Michigan act has not been
brought before the courts. Interestingly, that issue has been raised
post-Sutton in the context of Michigan's Worker's Disability
Compensation Act of 1969.303
The worker's compensation act provides for payments to
workers who are injured or become disabled on the job.3° Various
types of claims may be brought under the Michigan act, including
claims under a general disability provision,30 5 a "specific injuries"
296. Id. at *9.
297. Id. at *12.
298. Id. at *14.
299. Id. at *3.
300. Id.
301. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 37.1101-.1607 (2003).
302. See id. § 37.1103(d); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000).
303. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 418.101-.941 (2003).
304. Id. § 418.301(1).
305. Id.
Spring 2004] 1107
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1065
provision for loss of certain body parts, 30 6 and a "total and
permanent disability" provision for certain enumerated injuries.3 °7
The act does not specify, however, whether a general disability,
specific injury, or total and permanent disability should be
measured with regard to mitigating measures that might be
employed in the wake of an injury.
308
In Cain v. Waste Management, Inc. ,309 Cain was working as a
truck driver and trash collector for Waste Management when, as he
was standing behind his vehicle and emptying a trash receptacle, he
was struck by an automobile that crashed into the back of his
truck.310 His right leg had to be amputated and he was fitted with a
prosthesis, after which he returned to work at Waste Management,
Inc. in a clerical role.311 His left leg, which had also been injured but
was not amputated, continued to deteriorate until the point that he
could not support himself on the leg without the use of a specially
designed brace.
312
Initially, Cain prevailed before a magistrate in his claim for
benefits to compensate for total and permanent disability caused
by the loss of industrial use of both legs.3 13 Nevertheless, Waste
Management and its insurer successfully appealed the decision to
the Worker's Compensation Appellate Commission
("WCAC"). 314 The WCAC concluded that the magistrate should
have applied a "corrected" standard, similar to that used in
Sutton, when considering the remaining usefulness of Cain's braced
leg, such that due to the brace, Cain was not totally and permanently
disabled.315
However, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, recognizing
that precedent required it to use a "corrected" test in vision cases
and cases involving implants, but refusing to expand the test to
cases involving prosthetics or braces, which it classified as
306. Id. § 418.361(2).
307. Id. § 418.361(3).
308. Id. § 418.301,.361.
309. Cain v. Waste Mgmt, Inc., 638 N.W.2d 98 (Mich. 2002).
310. Id. at 100-01.
311. Id. at 101.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 102.
315. Id.
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different types of corrective devices. 3 16 The court distinguished
the two types of corrective devices based on their permanence,
noting in particular that Cain's brace was not permanently attached to
his leg.
317
Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Michigan reversed, holding
that the terms "permanent" and "total" in the statutory language
indicated that the "corrected" test should apply.318 Thus, in the
wake of Sutton, the court reinstated the WCAC's determination
that Cain was not totally and permanently disabled under the
"corrected" test.319
4. Minnesota
Minnesota protects disabled individuals under its Minnesota
Human Rights Act ("MHRA").320  The Minnesota Statutes'
definition of "disability," which applies to the MHRA, is similar to
that in the ADA. 32 ' As such, Minnesota courts follow the federal
model of the ADA in determining whether a person is disabled.
Thus, it appears likely that Minnesota courts would be inclined to
follow the Sutton mitigating measures rule in making disability
determinations.
While the issue has not been squarely addressed in Minnesota
since Sutton, Minnesota courts have adhered to other ADA
guidelines since that time. Also, Minnesota follows the Sutton
mitigating measures approach in situations where impaired
individuals do not utilize mitigating measures, though they could.
That is to say, Minnesota courts consider individuals in their actual
present state, whether mitigating measures are employed or could be
employed. Thus, it appears likely that mitigating measures would
be considered in MHRA disability determinations if they were
involved in a case brought under that statute.
316. Id. See ; O'Connor v. Binney Auto Parts, 513 N.W.2d 818 (Mich.
1994); Hakala v. Burroughs Corp., 338 N.W.2d 165 (Mich. 1983).
317. Cain, 638 N.W.2d at 102.
318. Id. at 104.
319. Id. at 107.
320. MINN. STAT. §§ 363A.01-.17, .19-.20, .38 (2003).
321. See id. § 363A.03 Subdivision 13.
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Kuechle v. Life's Companion P.C.A.. 3 2 2 is a post-Sutton case in
which Minnesota followed the mitigating measures rule of Sutton,
though it was applied in a situation that did not involve the use of
mitigating measures. 323 Kuechle was a nurse in a home health care
business who had been diagnosed with agoraphobia, a panic
disorder causing her to fear leaving her home and to avoid
traveling. 324  She sought treatment but declined to take the
medication recommended by psychologists and psychiatrists out of
fear of addiction.325 Instead of medication, Kuechle combated her
disorder by taking Fridays off of work during the winter months
and "forcing herself to go to public places during the day, when
fewer people were around., 326  She found that this process
acclimated her to leaving home.
327
Initially, Kuechle's employer allowed her to take Fridays off but
later took away the accommodation and eventually terminated her.
328
Before she was terminated, but after her multiple requests for
Fridays off were denied, Kuechle filed a disability discrimination
claim under the MHRA.329 The employer argued that Kuechle was
not a qualified individual under the MHRA because, if medicated,
she would not suffer from the symptoms of agoraphobia.
330
Applying the Sutton rule, the court disagreed.33'
The court followed the guidance of the ADA, and in its analysis
discussed the holding of Sutton, that persons are not to be evaluated
in their hypothetical, uncorrected state when determining if a person
has a disability under the ADA.332 The court went on to explain that
"[t]he use or nonuse of a corrective device does not determine
whether an individual is disabled; that determination depends on
.322. Kuechle v. Life's Companion P.C.A., 653 N.W.2d 214 (Minn. Ct. App.
2002).
323. See id.
324. Id. at 217.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 217-18.
329. Id. at 217.
330. Id. at 220.
331. Id. at221.
332. Id.
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whether the limitations an individual with an impairment actually
faces are in fact substantially limiting."
333
In recognizing that Sutton emphasized current, actual limitations,
the Minnesota court found that Kuechle was disabled because in her
unmedicated state, her disability continued to limit major life
334activities.  Thus, Kuechle was held to be a qualified person
under the ADA and, hence, under the MHRA as well.
335
5. District of Columbia
The District of Columbia protects disabled individuals under its
District of Columbia Human Rights Act ("DCHRA").336  The
DCHRA defines a "disability" as "a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of an
individual having a record of such an impairment or being
regarded as having such an impairment. '" 337 Thus, the definition
of "disability" under the DCHRA is substantially similar to that
of the ADA.
Since Sutton, D.C. courts have sometimes declined to find a
disability when considering mitigating measures, but the courts
have not always been consistent in this regard. Thus, it is still
possible for certain conditions, even when treated, to qualify as
disabilities for purposes of protection under the DCHRA.
In Grant v. May Department Stores Co. ,338 Grant was an insulin-
dependent diabetic who requested an altered work schedule at a
cosmetics counter in May Department Stores.339  "Through
diligent monitoring, diet, and insulin use, [she] was able to control
her blood sugar levels." 340 She even stated that while on insulin
"she felt 'pretty good,' could take care of herself, and did not have
problems with her vision or walking.
' 341
During Grant's periodic reviews, the department store managers
gave her negative evaluations, based in part on her unwillingness to
333. Id. (citing Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471m 488 (1999).
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 2-1401.01 to -1411.06 (2001).
337. Id. § 2-1401.02(5A).
338. Grant v. May Dep't Stores, Co., 786 A.2d 580 (D.C. 2001).
339. Id. at 581.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 585.
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maintain a normal working schedule, and refused to alter her work
schedule for several months until shortly before she left for
maternity leave.342 Upon her return to work, her position was no
longer available.
343
Grant sued the department store for failure to reasonably
accommodate her disability in violation of the DCHRA. 34  The
court applied the Sutton mitigating measures rule in its analysis of
whether Grant was covered under the DCHRA, considered her use of
insulin as a mitigating measure, and concluded that she was not
disabled under the DCHRA. 345 The court specifically recognized
that Grant's impairment was mitigated by insulin use, and decided
that when taking insulin, Grant was not substantially limited in any
major life activities.
346
It is still possible, however, for a condition to qualify as a
disability under the DCHRA, even where medication is involved
as a mitigating measure. 347 In Strass, the plaintiff, Strass, was
Director of Public Affairs for Kaiser Foundation Health Plan.348
After several years, the public affairs department substantially
reduced its staff, leaving Strass with increased responsibilities,
duties, and pressures.349 She began experiencing headaches, fatigue,
an inability to relax, and insomnia. 350 After conducting medical
tests, her doctor diagnosed Strass as having hypertension, and
attributed it to her work situation.3 5 1 Strass informed Kaiser,
through various channels, that the stress of the job, exacerbated by
inadequate staff, was making her ill. 352 She applied for a different
position within Kaiser, but she did not receive it.353 Kaiser did,
however, attempt to have Strass enroll in their Compass Career
342. Id. at 581-82.
343. Id. at 582.
344. Id. at 583.
345. Id. at 584-85.
346. Id. at 585.
347. See Strass v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Mid-Atlantic, 744 A.2d 1000
(D.C. 2000).
348. Id. at 1003.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 1004.
353. Id.
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Reappraisal Program, which she declined to do.354 Eventually,
she was terminated.355
Strass sued Kaiser alleging that her employment had been
terminated because of her physical handicap (hypertension) in
violation of the DCHRA.356 The court upheld the jury determination
that Strass was disabled under the DCHRA.357 Specifically citing
Sutton and considering Strass' medication as a mitigating
measure, the court still found that there was "ample evidence
from which the jury could find.., that Strass' condition, although
controlled by medication, was a disability within the meaning of the
Act. "358
Thus, in the District of Columbia it remains possible, even after
Sutton to prove disability where mitigating measures such as
medication are employed.
6. Tennessee
Tennessee's disability discrimination statute, entitled the
Tennessee Handicap Act ("THA"),3 59 does not define "handicap. 36 °
Therefore, Tennessee courts look to three sources to interpret this
term: (1) the Tennessee Human Rights Act ("THRA"), 361 which
defines "handicap"; (2) the ADA362 and Federal Rehabilitation
Act;363 and (3) federal and state case law interpreting those
statutes.
364
Because Tennessee law relies on the federal acts and
interpretations thereof to define "disability" or "handicap," its scope
of protection for handicapped individuals has dwindled as much as
the ADA's since the ruling on Sutton.
3 65
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id. at 1003.
357. Id. at 1010.
358. Id. at 1010 n.18.
359. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-50-103 (2002).
360. Davis v. Computer Maint. Serv., Inc., No. 01A01-9809-CV-00459,
1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 661, at *16 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 1999).
361. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-102(9) (1998).
362. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2002).
363. See 29 U.S.C. § 706(8).
364. Davis, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 661, at *16.
365. See id. at *16-*28.
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In Davis, the plaintiff was hired as a purchasing agent for
Computer Maintenance Service, Inc. ("CMS"), a job that "required
him to order and price parts over the phone, return defective
merchandise to manufacturers, receive incoming parts," and lift
heavy computer equipment. 366  Davis was an insulin-dependent
diabetic who took multiple daily insulin injections, as well as an oral
367medication to aid in digestion. One side effect of the oral
medication was a frequent, dry cough,368 which apparently affected
his ability to conduct business over the telephone and perform other
job duties.369
Two days after Davis began working,, he had a meeting with a
CMS supervisor, during which he was terminated. 370 Apparently,
the supervisor cited concerns regarding Davis' medical condition
during this meeting. 371 Davis subsequently brought suit under the
THA, which provides that "[t]here shall be no discrimination
in... hiring [or] firing ... upon any physical, mental or visual
handicap of the applicant." 372  Turning to the THRA for its
definition of "handicap," Davis argued that his diabetes was a
physical condition that substantially limited major life activities.
373
Davis specifically noted his need to administer insulin shots daily,
"take oral medication, monitor his condition, and comply with a
strict diet and exercise program." 374 . The court engaged in a
substantial analysis of Sutton and found that Davis "clearly [did] not
meet the first prong of the definition of 'handicap' set forth in the
THRA. ' ' 375 The court noted Davis' use of mitigating measures,
but pointed out that Davis did not identify any major life activity
that was substantially limited by his diabetes. 376 Therefore, Davis'
diabetes, in view of his ability to control it through mitigating
366. Id. at *2.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id. at *7, *9.
370. Id. at *2.
371. Id. at *2-*3.
372. Id. at *3, *15-*16.
373. Id. at*16-*18.
374. Id. at *18.
375. Id. at *24.
376. Id.
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measures, did not qualify him as a protected individual under the
THRA.377
7. Texas
Texas' state disability law is entitled the Texas Commission on
Human Rights Act ("TCHRA"). 3 8 One of the purposes behind the
TCHRA is to "provide for the execution of the policies embodied in
Title I of the [ADA] ... and its subsequent amendments." 379 Not
surprisingly, the TCHRA defines "disability" in relevant part as
"a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits at least
one major life activity., 380 This definition is, of course, similar to
that contained in the ADA.3 81 Also, because of the TCHRA's stated
purpose to promote federal policy, Texas courts routinely look to
analogous federal precedent for disability discrimination suits.
Since Sutton, Texas courts have not been likely to fred that a
plaintiff, who treats his impairment with a mitigating measure, is
"disabled" for purposes of the TCHRA. Texas courts consistently
apply the mitigating measures rule of Sutton to Texas disability law,
which seems to have generally precluded findings of disability
against which discrimination would otherwise be prohibited under
the TCHRA.
In Little, the plaintiff, Little, was impaired after she had the
lower half of her leg amputated as the result of an accidental shotgun
wound.382 Some twenty years later, during a two and a half year
period, she applied on fourteen separate occasions to the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice ("TDCJ") for a food service manager
position at various prisons.383 She was not hired for any of the
positions. 384 Little brought a discrimination claim under the TCHRA
for a pattern of discrimination in the TDCJ hiring practices. 385 The
issue before the court was whether Little had a "disability" as
377. Id. at *24, *28.
378. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 21.001-.556 (Vernon 1996).
379. Little v. Tex. Dep't. of Criminal Justice, No. 01-02-00733-CV, 2003
Tex. App. LEXIS 2734, at *4-*5 (Tex. App. Mar. 27, 2003).
380. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.002(6).
381. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(2002).
382. Little, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 2734, at *1.
383. Id. at *2.
384. Id.
385. Id. at *2 n.1.
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defined by the TCHRA.386 The court held that Little's amputated
leg qualified as a physical impairment, but questioned whether the
impairment rose to the level of "disabled" in view of the prosthesis
she regularly used.387
Little testified that even with her prosthesis, she could not "sit or
walk like other people," she could not "walk quickly," and "[could
not] run at all. 388 She argued that although her prosthesis enabled
her to walk, she remained "disabled" because of substantial
limitations on her ability to walk or run.
389
After a discussion of Sutton and its requirement to consider
mitigating measures, the court concluded that there was no summary
judgment evidence that her impairment, coupled with her prosthesis,
constituted a substantial limitation on a major life activity as
defined by the TCHRA. 390 The court recognized that there was
some evidence of Little's "impairment," but found that the evidence
also showed that Little could "walk well with the use of her
prosthesis, although with a slight limp and at a slower pace.",391 This
was insufficient to constitute a disability.392
In Stucky v. City of Houston,39 3 Stucky was a zookeeper who
brought suit under the TCHRA for unlawful termination by the City
because of a hearing impairment.394 Stucky was employed by the
City in October 1997, and was
terminated at the end of his one-year probationary period
for alleged poor performance. He was hearing impaired to
some extent in both ears, but was able to wear a hearing aid
in only one ear. At the time he was interviewed for the
position, he made known to his supervisor[s] ... that he had
a "hearing problem" and wore a hearing aid.395
386. See id. at *3.
387. Id. at *8-*9.
388. Id. at *7 (internal quotation marks omitted).
389. Id.
390. Id. at *8-*9.
391. Id.
392. Id. at *9.
393. Stucky v. City of Houston, No. 07-01-0299-CV, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS
2597 (Tex. App. Apr. 5, 2002).
394. Id. at *5.
395. Id.
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"In requests for admissions, [Stucky] admitted [that] his hearing
disability posed no limitation on his ability to perform the essential
functions of his position at the zoo, and he testified in his deposition
that his hearing loss or impairment did not affect his ability to do his
job. 396 However, the unavailability of quality radios at the zoo,
with which personnel communicated, made Stucky's job a
frustrating experience at times.
397
The court followed Sutton and recognized that Stucky had the
burden to show that his hearing condition with the use of a hearing
aid substantially limited a major life activity. 398 Not surprisingly, the
court found that Stucky failed to meet this burden because he was not
particularly limited in any major life activity when he used his
hearing aid. 399 The court recognized that Stucky's complaints
regarding the functioning of the radios were also made by other
employees.40 0 Thus, while the zoo may have needed better quality
telephones and radios in general, and while the zoo may have been a
noisy environment at times, the court found that Stucky failed to
show that the problems he suffered distinguished him from the
general population.4 0 ' Therefore, his hearing problems could not
be considered incapacitating in view of the mitigating effect of his
hearing aid, and Stucky was not sufficiently disabled to qualify for
protection under the TCHRA.4 ° 2
In another worker disability case, Kiser v. Original, Inc.,
4 0 3
Kiser was a restaurant waiter who brought suit under the TCHRA for
wrongful termination based upon his seizure disorder. 404 Kiser's
seizures were generally controlled by medication and avoiding
sleep deprivation.40 5 However, despite his attempts to control his
seizures, he still occasionally suffered from "mild to moderate"
406
seizures. °6 Usually, he would be able to predict the onset of a
396. Id. at *6.
397. Id. at *5-*7.
398. Id. at *7.
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. Kiser v. Original, Inc., 32 S.W.3d 449 (Tex. App. 2000).
404. Id. at 449-50.
405. Id. at 451.
406. Id.
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seizure about ten to fifteen minutes before it occurred, though
407sometimes he would experience them without warning.4°7
Kiser had two or three seizures during work at the restaurant.4 °8
After each seizure, the restaurant required that he obtain a
physician's release before returning to work.409 Upon his return to
work after one such seizure, his supervisor terminated him because
of his seizure disorder.
410
The court had to decide whether Kiser's seizure disorder, in
light of the mitigating measures, qualified as a disability under the
1 412TCHRA.4 1 The conclusion was that it did not. Citing Sutton,
the court noted that Kiser admitted his seizures were "generally
controlled by medication and rest, and that any seizures he did
have were only occasional and, at worst, moderate. ' 413 The court
found that "[w]hile there was some evidence of impairment, there
was no evidence such impairment constituted a substantial limitation of
a major life activity.
' 4 14
Clearly, it would be difficult to bring a successful claim under
the TCHRA in any case involving the use of mitigating measures.
There does not appear to be any post-Sutton example of a mitigated
impairment that rises to the level of a TCHRA disability.
8. Louisiana
Louisiana's state disability law is encompassed within its
Louisiana Human Rights Act ("LHRA").415 One of the stated
purposes of the state act is "to safeguard all individuals within the
state from discrimination because of... disability.' '416 Among other
things, the LHRA prohibits discrimination "in connection with
employment" and states that disabled persons should have "full
productive capacities in employment. ' '417 Under the LHRA a person
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Id.
412. Id.
413. Id. at 453.
414. Id.
415. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:2231-:2265 (West 2003).
416. Id. § 51:2231(A).
417. Id.
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is "disabled" if he or she suffers from "a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major
life activities of the individual.' 418 Thus, it bears similarity to the
ADA definition of "disability." Because of this and other
similarities, Louisiana courts look to federal law and precedent,
including the ADA and the Federal Rehabilitation Act, to define,
interpret, and apply the LHRA in state disability actions.419
In Hook, the plaintiff, Hook, was terminated from his position
as the manager of transportation and distribution for defendant
corporation's Louisiana plant three days after an angry confrontation
with the plant manager. 420 Shortly before the incident, "Hook had
been diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)
and was being treated" with medication.421 Hook asserted that the
confrontation occurred because the medication resulted in
irritation and an inability to control his emotions.422 Therefore,
he argued, his termination was the result of a disability. 423 He
brought suit under the LHRA.424
The trial court found that Hook was both disabled and protected
under the LHRA, and that the defendant corporation unlawfully
discriminated against him.425 He was awarded more than $2 million
in damages.426
On appeal, the court reversed the decision, holding that Hook
was not disabled and, therefore, was not qualified for protection
under the LHRA.427 The court began its analysis by noting that
"[b]ecause the LHRA is similar in scope to [the ADA] and provides
for the execution of the federal anti-discrimination policies,
Louisiana courts appropriately consider interpretations of [the ADA]
when interpreting our own state laws. 428 Thus, Sutton applied to
the disability determination that is necessarily the threshold
418. Id. § 51:2232(11)(a).
419. Hook v. Georgia-Gulf Corp., 788 So. 2d 47, 53 n.8 (La. Ct. App. 2001).
420. Id. at 49.
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. Id.
424. Id.
425. Id.
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. Id. at 53 n.8.
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question in any disability claim under the LHRA.4 29 The court
then recognized that, under Sutton, courts must take into account
both positive and negative effects of any mitigating measures when
making a disability determination.
430
Although ADHD qualifies as an impairment that, in some
instances, may substantially limit an individual's major life
activities, the experts who testified on Hook's behalf failed to
address how the medication affected his ability to learn.4 31 The court
found insufficient evidence that Hook was substantially limited in
his ability to learn despite the medication and thus did not
consider him disabled.432
On the other hand, not all cases in which courts consider
mitigating measures necessarily culminate in a finding that the
individual is not disabled. Bazert v. Louisiana Department of
Safety and Corrections,433 which involved the ADA rather than a
state disability law,434 is an example of a post-Sutton case in which
a court considered the plaintiffs mitigating measures but
determined that the plaintiff had a "disability" within the scope of
the ADA.435
The Department of Corrections employed Bazert at the
Louisiana State Penitentiary for about sixteen years when his
employer forced him to take sick leave because of his asthma
condition.436  Medications controlled Bazert's asthma quite
successfully for many years, until he was reassigned to a
confined area in the prison dormitories.437 There, he faced
increased exposure to cigarette smoke, aftershave lotions, cologne,
and cleaning chemicals-all of which worsened his asthma
condition. 438  The corrections department refused to change his
429. Id. at 53 (citing Talk v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 165 F.3d 1021, 1024 (5th
Cir. 1999)).
430. Id.
431. Id. at 54.
432. Id.
433. Bazert v. La. Dep't of Safety & Corr., 768 So. 2d 279 (La. Ct. App.
2000).
434. Yet, a determination as to the scope of the ADA is squarely applicable
to Louisiana state disability law, as described above.
435. Id. at 283.
436. Id. at 280.
437. Id. at 280-81.
438. Id. at281.
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assignment, move him to a more open area, or otherwise provide him
with reasonable accommodations. Instead, the department forced
him to take sick leave.
440
The court found that mitigating medical measures did not
correct Bazert's condition because his asthma limited his breathing
in both a medicated and an unmedicated state.441 Therefore, the
court held that Bazert had a physical impairment that substantially
limited him in a major life activity (breathing), and he thus qualified
as a disabled individual under the ADA." 2
Although Bazert brought this case under the ADA rather than a
state disability law, the federal rules apply to the Louisiana statute.
It therefore follows that although Louisiana considers mitigating
measures in disability determinations under the state statute, because
those measures do not always result in a "no disability" finding
under the ADA, they should not necessarily result in a "no disability"
finding under the LHRA.
9. Massachusetts
Massachusetts prohibits discrimination against individuals with
disabilities under its antidiscrimination statute.443  As with many
other state disability laws, the statute defines "handicap" as "a
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or
more major life activities of a person." 444 Thus, it bears similarity
to the ADA definition of "disability. ' 4 5 However, Massachusetts
does not consider mitigating measures in making disability
determinations under the anti-discrimination statutes. Even since
Sutton, Massachusetts courts have consistently rejected arguments
that mitigating measures should be considered in such decisions.
In Dahill v. Police Department,446 Dahill was born with a severe
hearing impairment, such that without the use of hearing aids, his
hearing was significantly impaired." 7  With the use of hearing
439. Id.
440. Id.
441. Id. at 283.
442. Id.
443. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, §§ 1-10 (2003).
444. Id. § 1(17).
445. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2002).
446. Dahill v. Police Dep't, 748 N.E.2d 956 (Mass. 2001).
447. Id. at 958.
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aids, however, Dahill's auditory ability was corrected to within
normal limits. 448 He obtained a provisional employment offer with
the Boston Police Department and .entered its academy's training
program.449 At the academy, several episodes raised concerns that
Dahill's hearing might make him unfit to be a police officer.450 For
example, he did not respond to an oral instruction during a training
session, did not respond to a radio call, and failed to hear a gunshot
during a firearms training exercise.451  After a series of auditory
tests, a medical specialist reported to the Police Department that
Dahill's hearing impairment raised a major question of safety
regarding his ability to perform the duties of a police officer.452
The Department terminated him on the basis that his "auditory
deficiencies" rendered him "incapable of effectively and safely
performing the essential duties of a Police Officer."
453
In Dahill's claim under the Massachusetts anti-discrimination
statute, the issue before the court was whether his use of hearing
aids should be considered in determining whether he was
"disabled. 454 The Police Department urged the court to follow the
guidance of Sutton in applying mitigating measures to disability
determinations. 455  After a thorough review of Massachusetts'
legislative intent, the court concluded that the anti-discrimination
statute provided a broad mandate for protection against disability
discrimination, under which the term "handicap" did not require
consideration of corrective devices.456 Accordingly, the court did not
consider Dahill's hearing aids in its disability determination, and
he was held to be a qualified individual within the protective scope
of the anti-discrimination statute.457
Although mitigating measures are not considered in disability
determinations under the state anti-discrimination statute,
Massachusetts must of course consider mitigating measures in claims
448. Id.
449. Id.
450. Id.
451. Id.
452. Id.
453. Id. at 959 (internal quotation marks omitted).
454. Id.
455. Id.
456. Id. at 959-62.
457. Id. at 964.
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brought under the ADA. In one post-Sutton example, Shedlock v.
Department of Correction,458 a prisoner brought an ADA claim
against the Department of Correction ("DOC") for unlawful
discrimination against him on the basis of a physical handicap.459
Shedlock had been in a serious motor vehicle accident before his
incarceration, which resulted in chronic lower back pain and arthritis
in his ankle.46° When the DOC attempted to move him to a new
housing cell on the second floor, which was accessible only by stairs,
Shedlock refused the assignment and requested a first floor cell
because his "disability" prevented him from being able to climb
stairs.4 61 The DOC did not accommodate Shedlock's request, and he
eventually brought a discrimination suit under the ADA.462
The court cited Sutton in its decision to consider the cane that
Shedlock used in determining whether he had a disability.463 Thus,
in deciding whether Shedlock was substantially limited in his ability
to walk, a major life activity, the court considered that ability as
assisted by a cane.464 With his cane, Shedlock was able "to get out
and walk for an hour" on an average day at the prison.465 He was
sometimes able to walk for two hours, and twice a day he stood in
line at the health unit for between twenty and forty minutes to
receive sinus medication.466 Shedlock also was able to climb stairs
to obtain cleaning supplies for his cell and to attend computer
classes three times a week.467 Based on this evidence of Shedlock's
ability to walk with the assistance of a cane, the court concluded that
he was not substantially limited in doing so and therefore was not
"disabled" for purposes of protection under the ADA.468
Taking their lead from the Supreme Court's decision in Sutton,
some state judiciaries have reduced the scope of their own states'
458. Shedlock v. Dep't of Corr., No. 98-3631-F, 2002 WL 31356205, at *1
(Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 3, 2002).
459. Id. at *2-*3.
460. Id. at *1-'2.
461. Id. at*1.
462. Id. at *1-*3.
463. Id. at *4.
464. Id.
465. Id.
466. Id.
467. Id.
468. Id. at *4-*5.
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disability statutes by construing them to require consideration of
mitigating measures. However, because state laws may provide
more protection than that afforded by similar federal statutes, state
judiciaries do not necessarily have to make such statutory
constructions.
Statutes that are based upon, that are derived from, or that
incorporate the policies, language, or definitions of the ADA are
more likely to now require consideration of mitigating measures.
Such statutes are found in states such as Minnesota, District of
Columbia, Tennessee, Texas, and Louisiana.469 On the other hand,
state statutes that are more independently defined need not be so
restricted. Examples include the California, Michigan, and
Massachusetts statutes. 47°  The result is that most states now
consider mitigating measures in disability determinations under
their state laws, and only a handful continue either to refuse to
consider mitigating measures or to refuse to recognize a disability
despite mitigating measures in the wake of Sutton.
C. Interactive Process
This section examines various courts' interpretations of the
Interactive Process of the Federal Americans with Disabilities Act
4 71
outlined by the EEOC. The Interactive Process is a problem-solving
approach employees and employers use to determine the appropriate
reasonable accommodation for the disabled employee.472 When the
appropriate accommodation is obvious, the employer and the
employee may not need to engage in the Interactive Process to
determine a reasonable accommodation.473
For example, if an employee who uses a wheelchair
requests that his or her desk be placed on blocks to elevate
the desktop above the arms of the wheelchair and the
employer complies, an appropriate accommodation has
been requested, identified, and provided without either the
employee or employer being aware of having engaged in
any sort of "reasonable accommodation process."
469. See discussion supra Part III.B.4-8.
470. See discussion supra Part III.B2-3, 9.
471. 29 C.F.R. § 1630 (2003).
472. Id. § 1630.2.
473. Id. § 1630.9 app. at 364.
1124
DISABILITY RIGHTS
However, in some instances neither the individual
requesting the accommodation nor the employer can readily
identify the appropriate accommodation. For example, the
individual needing the accommodation may not know
enough about the equipment used by the employer or the
exact nature of the work site to suggest an appropriate
accommodation. Likewise, the employer may not know
enough about the individual's disability or the limitations
that disability would impose on the performance of the job
to suggest an appropriate accommodation. Under such
circumstances, it may be necessary for the employer to
initiate a more defined problem solving process, such as the
step-by-step process described [below], as part of its
reasonable effort to identify the appropriate reasonable
accommodation.474
First, the employer should determine the purpose and essential
functions of the individual's job.475 Next, the employer and
employee should discuss the exact job-related limitations and the
ways in which a reasonable accommodation might help.476 Both
parties should then make a list of potential accommodations and
identify how each accommodation would prove effective in
overcoming the limitations and enabling the individual to perform
the essential functions of his or her job.477 Finally, the employer
should implement the most appropriate accommodation, taking into
consideration the preference of the individual and resources available
to the employer.478 If more than one reasonable accommodation is
possible, the employer should give primary consideration to the one
the employee prefers. 479 The employer, however, makes the ultimate
decision as to which accommodation to provide. As a result, the
employer may opt to furnish the accommodation that is the least
expensive or the easiest to implement.
480
474. Id.
475. Id.
476. Id.
477. Id.
478. Id.
479. Id.
480. Id.
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1. Federal law
The United States Supreme Court has not yet ruled on this issue.
However, an examination of recent circuit court cases suggests it is
likely that the Court will consider this issue because of the variety of
approaches taken in the different circuits. In keeping with recent
Supreme Court opinions, it appears that when the Court does
consider this issue, it will probably not rule favorably to protect the
civil rights of persons with disabilities. The next section looks at the
different circuit court opinions and highlights the differences in those
courts. Until the Supreme Court rules on this issue, the circuit courts
are able to experiment in their different jurisdictions.
The first question that arises is whether an employer's failure to
participate in the interactive process creates automatic liability
independent from a failure to accommodate an employee's disability.
The federal circuit courts of appeals are split on the issue of whether
employers have a duty to engage in the interactive process and
whether independent liability exists if an employer fails to engage in
the interactive process.481 While all courts agree that employers
should engage in an interactive process with their employees, the
Eleventh Circuit would not permit a cause of action against an
employer who fails to engage in an interactive process.482 The First
Circuit has taken the schizophrenic position that the interactive
process is merely permissive, but that situations may exist where it is
mandatory.483 The Third, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits
have taken the position that once an employee requests a reasonable
accommodation, the employer has a duty to engage in an interactive
481. See infra notes 482-87 and accompanying text.
482. See Willis v. Conopco, Inc., 108 F.3d 282, 285 (lth Cir. 1997)
(holding that the employee has the burden of showing available
accommodations and that the employer cannot be found "liable merely for
failing to engage in the [interactive] process itself').
483. The First Circuit appears to take the position that EEOC regulations are
permissive rather than mandatory. See Jacques v. Clean-Up Group, Inc., 96
F.3d 506, 513 (1st Cir. 1996) ("The regulations' use of 'may' clearly suggests
that Congress, while it could have imposed an affirmative obligation upon
employers in all cases, chose not to."). However, the First Circuit also stated,
"There may well be situations in which the employer's failure to engage in an
informal interactive process would constitute a failure to provide reasonable
accommodation that amounts to a violation of the ADA." Id. at 515.
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484
process. However, of those circuits requiring employer
participation in the interactive process, only the Seventh Circuit
appears willing to assign independent liability for failure to engage in
the interactive process.485 Rather than impose independent liability,
those circuits recognizing a duty to engage in the interactive process
have held that the employee still has the burden of proving that a
reasonable accommodation could have been made,486 and evidence
that an employer acted in bad faith in the interactive process only
precludes summary judgment for the employer.487
In Willis, the Eleventh Circuit held that employers cannot be
held independently liable for failing to engage in the interactive
488process. Willis was an employee at Lever Brothers (Conopco)
who had sensitivity to enzymes in the laundry detergent she
packaged. 489  To accommodate Willis, Conopco attempted to
minimize her exposure to the enzymes by transferring her to a new
position and by directing her to wear a mask when crossing the
packing area floor.490  Following unrelated foot surgery, Willis
484. See, e.g., Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000)
("[T]he interactive process is a mandatory rather than a permissive obligation
on the part of employers under the ADA."), vacated on other grounds by 535
U.S. 391 (2002); Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 188 F.3d 944, 952 (8th
Cir. 1999) ("[W]hen the disabled individual requests accommodation, it
becomes necessary to initiate the interactive process."); Taylor v. Phoenixville
Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 314-15 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that the employer's
duty to engage in the interactive process is triggered "[o]nce the employer
knows of the disability and the employee's desire for accommodations" and
that the employer must "'meet the employee half-way' by requesting
additional information (quoting Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Sch., 100
F.3d 1281, 1285 (7th Cir. 1990))); Taylor v. Principal Fin. Group, Inc., 93 F.3d
155, 165 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding that an employee's request for
accommodation obligates the employer to participate in the interactive process
of determining a reasonable accommodation); Beck v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of
Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1135-37 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that both parties have
a responsibility to participate in an interactive process).
485. See, e.g., Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 213 F.3d 365, 373 (7th Cir.
2000) (upholding jury verdict for employee because employer failed to engage
in an interactive process).
486. See Barnett, 288 F.3d at 1114; Fjellestad, 188 F.3d at 952;
Phoenixville, 184 F.3d at 315; Principal Fin. Group, 93 F.3d at 165.
487. See Barnett, 288 F.3d at 1116; Fjellestad, 188 F.3d at 953;
Phoenixville, 184 F.3d at 318.
488. Willis v. Conopco, Inc., 108 F.3d 282, 285 (11th Cir. 1997).
489. Id. at 283.
490. Id.
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provided Conopco with a doctor's letter stating that she had an
immune system abnormality and should stop working at the plant.49'
At this point, Willis refused to return to work and requested that
Conopco either reassign her to a new building or enclose the area in
which she worked.492 Conopco then arranged for a doctor to
examine Willis, and the doctor determined that she was able to return
to work.493 When Willis failed to return to work, Conopco
terminated her employment.494
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's granting of
summary judgment in favor of Conopco. 495 The court held that
"where a plaintiff cannot demonstrate 'reasonable accommodation,'
the employer's lack of investigation into reasonable accommodation
is unimportant. 'A96 The court expressed fear of potential employer
liability for failing to engage in the interactive process in instances
where an investigation into reasonable accommodations "would [be]
fruitless. ' 497 The court also stated that the punitive approach of
automatic employer liability for failure to participate in an interactive
process is inconsistent with the basic remedial goals of the ADA,
which work to ensure that individuals with disabilities "can fully
participate in all aspects of society, including the workplace.
' 498
The First Circuit in Jacques v. Clean-Up Group, Inc.49 9 could
not decide whether the interactive process was mandatory or
permissive.500  He was employed as an all-purpose cleaning
person.50 1 Jacques suffered from epilepsy and was not permitted to
drive a motor vehicle.50 2 Jacques was able to travel to work by
walking, riding a bicycle, or riding in one of the Clean-Up Group's
vans prior to being laid off on February 19, 1994.503 On February 24,
491. Id.
492. Id.
493. Id. at 284.
494. Id.
495. Id. at 287.
496. Id. at 285 (quoting Moses v. Am. Nonwovens, Inc., 97 F.3d 446, 448
( lIth Cir. 1996)).
497. Id. (quoting Moses, 97 F.3d at 448).
498. Id.
499. Jacques v. Clean-up Group, Inc., 96 F.3d 506 (1st Cir. 1996).
500. Id. at 513-14.
501. Id. at 509.
502. Id.
503. Id.
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1994, the Clean-Up Group offered Jacques a position cleaning an ice
504arena approximately three miles from his home. Jacques was
informed that the company van would not be provided to transport
him to and from work and that he would have to arrange for his own
transportation. 50 5  Jacques informed the Clean-Up Group that he
could take a bus but could not arrive to work until sometime between
10:00 A.M. and 10:30 A.M. pursuant to the relevant bus schedule.
50 6
The Clean-Up Group could not accommodate him because the arena
had to be completed at 9:30 A.M.507 Subsequently, Jacques argued
that the group failed to engage in an informal interactive process
with him.
50 8
The First Circuit held in favor of the employer Clean-Up Group
stating that "[t]he [EEOC] regulations' use of 'may' clearly suggests
that Congress, while it could have imposed an affirmative obligation
upon employers in all cases, chose not to." 509 However, the court
also stated, "There may well be situations in which the employer's
failure to engage in an informal interactive process would constitute
a failure to provide reasonable accommodation that amounts to a
violation of the ADA., 510  Clearly, the question of whether the
interactive process is mandatory in the First Circuit remains
unanswered.51'
504. Id.
505. Id.
506. Id.
507. Id. at 509-510.
508. Id.
509. Id. at 513.
510. Id. at 515.
511. See Calero-Cerezo v. United States Dep't of Justice, 355 F.3d 6 (1st
Cir. 2004); Kvorjak v. Maine, 259 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 2001); Phelps v. Optima
Health, Inc., 251 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2001); Reed v. Lepage Bakeries, Inc., 244
F.3d 254 (1st Cir. 2001); Garcia-Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d
638 (1st Cir. 2000); Ward v. Mass. Health Research Inst., Inc., 209 F.3d 29
(1st Cir. 2000); Soto-Ocasio v. Fed. Express Corp., 150 F.3d 14 (1st Cir.
1998); Rodriguez v. Pfizer Pharm., Inc., 286 F. Supp. 2d 144 (D.P.R. 2003);
Dudley v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 190 F. Supp. 2d 69 (D. Me. 2002); Sprague v.
United Airlines, Inc., No. CIV.A.97-12102-GAO, 2002 WL 1803733 (D.
Mass. Aug. 7, 2002); Rennie v. United Parcel Serv., 139 F. Supp. 2d 159 (D.
Mass. 2001); Ladenheim v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d 225 (D.P.R.
2000); Littlefield v. York County, No. 99-277-P-C, 2000 WL 760959 (D. Me.
Apr. 28, 2000); Cruz v. McAllister Bros., 52 F. Supp. 2d 269 (D.P.R. 1999);
Guckenberger v. Boston Univ., 974 F. Supp. 106 (D. Mass. 1997).
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In Taylor v. Phoenixville School District,512 the Third Circuit
held that employers have a duty to engage in an interactive process
with an employee to determine an appropriate reasonable
accommodation. 3 Taylor worked for twenty years as a principal's
secretary in the Phoenixville School District. 51 4 In late August 1993,
Taylor began to suffer from the onset of bipolar disorder.515 During
Taylor's leave of absence, Taylor's son stated that he had numerous
phone conversations with the school district's administrative
assistant for personnel, including one conversation in which he stated
that his mother would require accommodations when she returned to
work. 16 Upon Taylor's return to work in October 1993, her
principal immediately began to document her errors.5 17  In
September 1994, Taylor was placed on thirty days probation and
eventually terminated in October 1994. 5 18 Taylor then brought suit
under the ADA alleging that the school district failed to provide her
reasonable accommodations for her mental illness.51 9
The Third Circuit held in favor of Taylor stating that the
interactive process required employers to make a good-faith effort to
seek accommodations. 520  Further, the court concluded that the
"interactive process does not dictate that any particular concession
must be made by the employer; nor does the process remove the
employee's burden of showing that a particular accommodation
rejected by the employer would have made the employee qualified to
perform the job's essential functions. ' 2 '
Similarly, in Taylor v. Principal Financial Group, Inc.,522 the
Fifth Circuit held that an employee's request for accommodation
obligates the employer to participate in the interactive process of
determining a reasonable accommodation.5 23 Taylor suffered from
512. Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 1999).
513. Id. at 319.
514. Id. at 302.
515. Id.
516. Id. at 303.
517. Id. at 304.
518. Id. at 305.
519. Id. at 301.
520. Id. at 317.
521. Id.
522. Taylor v. Principal Fin. Group, Inc., 93 F.3d 155 (5th Cir. 1996).
523. Id. at 165.
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bipolar disorder. 524  The employer was unhappy with Taylor's
performance, and the parties had met in the past to determine how
Taylor could become more productive.525  During one of the
meetings, Taylor informed his supervisor that he was struggling with
a mental illness and asked his supervisor to research the disease so
that the employer could gain a better understanding of the
symptoms. 526  In addition, Taylor asked for a reduction in his
performance objectives and less "pressure., 527 Taylor's supervisor
asked him if he was "all right," to which Taylor replied "yeah. 528
Taylor then sent an e-mail to his employer detailing his belief that he
could meet his performance expectations. 529 When Taylor did not
meet his objectives, the employer granted him an extension.
530
Taylor took a leave of absence due to his illness and subsequently
filed suit alleging that the employer was liable under the ADA for
failing to provide a reasonable accommodation.
531
The Fifth Circuit held that Taylor failed to notify his employer
that his disability caused limitations, so the need for reasonable
accommodation and the interactive process did not arise.532 The
Fifth Circuit, however, noted that had a request for accommodation
been made, "the responsibility for fashioning a reasonable
accommodation [would have been] shared between the employee and
employer., 533  The court recognized that an employer has an
affirmative obligation to participate in a flexible, interactive process,
or the employer may be liable for failing to provide a reasonable
accommodation.534
Likewise, in Beck v. University of Wisconsin Board of
Regents,535 the Seventh Circuit held that both parties have a
536responsibility to participate in an interactive process. Beck, a
524. Id. at 159.
525. Id. at 158-59.
526. Id. at 159.
527. Id.
528. Id.
529. Id. at 159-60.
530. Id. at 160.
531. Id. at 160-61.
532. Id. at 163-64.
533. Id. at 165 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9 app. (1995)).
534. Id.
535. Beck v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130 (7th Cir. 1996).
536. Id. at 1135-37.
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secretarial employee, suffered from osteoarthritis and depression. 537
After a three month medical leave, Beck was assigned to a new
position and given a month to learn a word processing program.
538
Thereafter, Beck suffered from osteoarthritis aggravated by repetitive
keyboarding. 539  Beck's doctors recommended that she avoid
repetitive keyboarding. 540  A few months later, Beck was
hospitalized with severe depression and anxiety.541  When she
returned to work, Beck had a note from her doctor indicating that she
may require some reasonable accommodation so that she would not
have a recurrence.
542
The University then requested that Beck sign a release allowing
them to obtain further medical information from her doctor, which
she refused to do. 543 Beck then took a second medical leave, and on
her return to work, she had another letter from her doctor indicating
that she may require assistance with her workload and an adjustable
keyboard a.5  The University told Beck that they needed more
information to understand what accommodations she needed.545
Beck was also temporarily moved to a new room, given a wrist pad,
and given a reduced workload. 46 Beck was not satisfied with the
new assignment and complained that the new room was not properly
ventilated.547 Beck then took a third medical leave and was granted a
six-month unpaid medical leave of absence. 548 During her medical
leave of absence, Beck filed a charge with the EEOC and
subsequently filed suit in the district court under the ADA.549 After
filing suit, Beck requested that she be reinstated at the University in a
different department.550 The University denied her request and told
537. Id. at 1132.
538. Id.
539. Id.
540. Id.
541. Id.
542. Id. at 1132-33.
543. Id. at 1133.
544. Id.
545. Id.
546. Id.
547. Id.
548. Id.
549. Id.
550. Id.
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her to report to work in the same department.5 5 1 When she did not
report to work, she was terminated by the University.
552
The Seventh Circuit held in favor of the University concluding
that the University had properly engaged in the interactive process
and Beck had caused the breakdown by failing to provide requested
medical information and refusing to sign a medical release. The
court noted that before a failure to provide a reasonable
accommodation triggers ADA liability, the employee bears the initial
burden of informing the employer of the disability.5 5 4 However, the
Fifth Circuit further acknowledged that the EEOC regulations
envisioned an interactive process in which both parties participate.555
Accordingly, the court held that once an employer knows of an
employee's disability, and the employee has requested reasonable
accommodations, the parties are required to engage in an interactive
process to determine what accommodations are necessary, and
liability for failure to provide reasonable accommodations ensues
only when the employer is responsible for a breakdown in the
process.
556
The Eighth Circuit in Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc.
557
held that "when the disabled individual requests accommodation, it
becomes necessary to initiate the interactive process. 558 There,
Fjellestad had been a successful unit manager of the Yankton, South
Dakota, Pizza Hut restaurant for more than sixteen years prior to her
automobile accident on December 14, 1994.559 Fjellestad's injuries
were serious and required hospitalization and extensive recovery
560time. On April 28, 1995, Fjellestad's doctors released her to work
two hours every other day. However, in early May 1995, Fjellestad
suffered another accident and was again prohibited from working.56'
551. Id.
552. Id.
553. Id. at 1136-37.
554. Id. at 1134.
555. Id. at 1135.
556. Id. at 1137.
557. Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 188 F.3d 944 (8th Cir. 1999).
558. Id. at 952.
559. Id. at 947.
560. Id.
561. Id.
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Fjellestad returned to work in June 1995 when her doctors
released her to work four hours every other day for a total of twelve
hours per week. 62 However, for the next four months, Fjellestad
was cited for poor performance.5 63 On October 23, 1995, a Pizza
Hut supervisor met with Fjellestad and told her that once she had
exhausted her available leave time under the Family Medical Leave
Act, she would be welcomed back to the full-time unit manager
position. 564 Swanson also advised Fjellestad that if she was unable to
work the required fifty hours per week, she would be demoted to
shift manager.
5 65
In response Fjellestad filed a grievance letter with Pizza Hut
requesting reasonable accommodations.5 66 Pizza Hut placed her on a
sixty-day performance plan that included bi-weekly evaluations.
567
On January 16, 1996, Fjellestad's doctors concluded that she had
reached her maximum recovery and limited her to working thirty-
five to forty hours per week with no more than three consecutive
days of work.568 On February 8, 1996, twelve days before the end of
the sixty-day performance plan, Swanson terminated Fjellestad for
allegedly failing to make adequate progress in meeting the targets set
forth in the performance plan.569
The Eighth Circuit decided in favor of Fjellestad and held that
employers who receive notice that a reasonable accommodation is
requested have a duty to engage in an interactive process with the
requesting employee. 570 However, the court also held that no per se
liability exists under the ADA if an employer fails to engage in the
571interactive process.
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit in Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc. 572
emphatically held that employers are required to take part in the
562. Id.
563. Id. at 948.
564. Id. at 948 n.1.
565. Id.
566. Id. at 948, 952.
567. Id. at 948.
568. Id. at 948-49.
569. Id. at 948.
570. Id. at 953 (citing Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 174 F.3d 142, 162
(3d Cir. 1999)).
571. Id. at 952.
572. Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated on
other grounds by 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
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interactive process. 573 There, Barnett, a ten-year employee of U.S.
Air injured his back while handling cargo at work.574 Barnett's
restrictions included prohibitions from excessive bending, twisting,
turning, prolonged standing or sitting, and from lifting twenty-five
pounds or more.575 When Barnett could no longer perform the
physical requirements of his job because of his back injury, he used
his seniority to obtain a position in the mailroom.576 However,
approximately two years later, Barnett learned that two individuals,
who were higher in U.S. Air's seniority system, sought to transfer to
the mailroom. 577 Fearing that he would lose his mailroom position,
Barnett asked for an ADA accommodation, seeking an exception to
the company's seniority system that would allow him to remain in
the mailroom. 578 U.S. Air declined to supersede its seniority system,
but for the next five months placed Barnett on "limited duty,"
allowing him to work in a temporary swing-shift mailroom
position.579 Subsequently, Barnett was placed on job injury leave,
which continued his salary for one month.5 8 0 Barnett then requested
two other forms of accommodation that U.S. Air denied.58'
The Ninth Circuit decided in favor of Barnett in holding that the
"interactive process is a mandatory rather than a permissive
obligation on the part of employers under the ADA and that this
obligation is triggered by an employee or an employee's
representative giving notice of the employee's disability and the
desire for accommodation., 582 The court went one step further and
announced that "[iun circumstances in which an employee is unable
to make such a request, if the company knows of the existence of the
employee's disability, the employer must assist in initiating the
interactive process. 583
573. Id. at 1114.
574. Id. at 1108.
575. Id. at 1123 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
576. Id. at 1108.
577. Id. at 1108-09.
578. Id. at 1109.
579. Id.
580. Id.
581. Id.
582. Id. at 1114.
583. Id.
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While the majority of circuits recognize an employer's duty to
participate in the interactive process, they fail to impart independent
liability when an employer avoids this obligation. Without such
liability, it is difficult to perceive how the EEOC's interactive
process will protect the rights of the disabled.
There is little state case law about the duty to use an interactive
process, but some examples follow. Also, it is interesting to note
that some states have statutory schemes that require a different
calculation in the reasonable accommodation analysis. In Arizona,
the practice of reassigning a disabled person to a vacant position, as a
reasonable accommodation, is not required only as a last resort, as it
is under the ADA. Therefore, under Arizona law, the process of
reasonable accommodation must discuss the possibility of
reassignment from the start.584 In Delaware, an accommodation that
costs less than five percent of an employee's annual salary is
presumed reasonable.
585
2. West Virginia
In Skaggs v. Elk Run Coal Co., 586 the court held that both the
employer and employee have a duty to work together. 587 The court
said:
Neither the West Virginia statutes nor the federal law
assigns responsibility for when the interactive process is not
meaningfully undertaken, but we infer that neither party
should be able to cause a breakdown in the process .... A
party that obstructs or delays the interactive process or fails
to communicate, by way of initiation or response, is acting
in bad faith.
588
3. Wisconsin
In Crystal Lake Cheese Factory v. Labor and Industry Review
Commission,589 the court upheld the Labor and Industry Review
584. See Ransom v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 983 F. Supp. 895 (D. Ariz. 1997).
585. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 722(6)(e) (Supp. 2003).
586. Skaggs v. Elk Run Coal Co., 479 S.E.2d 561 (W. Va. 1996).
587. Id. at 577.
588. Id. at 577-78.
589. Crystal Lake Cheese Factory v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 664
N.W.2d 651 (Wis. 2003).
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Commission's ("LIRC") interpretation of the Wisconsin Fair
Employment Act's ("WFEA") 59° ban on employment discrimination
on the basis of disability.591 The LIRC's interpretation requires an
employer to reasonably accommodate an employee that cannot
perform all of his or her job duties as opposed to the ADA's
requirement to make accommodations only to those who can perform
the "essential functions" of a position.5 92  Catlin, the disabled
employee, asserted that as department head, her primary
responsibility was to process orders and inventory sheets, tasks she
still could perform after a non-work related car accident that left her
a quadriplegic. 593 Crystal Lake argued that "federal courts have
routinely held that reasonable accommodation does not require an
employer to eliminate job duties, create a new job, or employ others
to perform functions that a disabled employee cannot perform" and
"[c]onsequently, ask[ed the court] to find that the WFEA's
reasonable accommodation provision does not require an employer
to create a new position for a disabled employee.
594
Under the WFEA, once a complainant shows he or she is
handicapped and the employer has taken one of the enumerated
actions, the burden shifts to the employer to prove hardship of
imposing a reasonable accommodation or that even with a reasonable
accommodation, the employee cannot adequately undertake the job-
related responsibilities.595 If the employer is unable to do so, the
employer violates the WFEA.
596
Section 111.34 of the Wisconsin Statutes requires employers
dealing with handicapped employees to evaluate the individual to
determine whether he or she can meet the requirements of the job in
question.597 In Crystal Lake, "Catlin point[ed] out that Crystal Lake
never inquired of her as to what accommodations she needed.
598
Instead, Crystal Lake hired a job analysis evaluator to examine the
job with regard to what accommodations were required for a person
590. WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.31-.395 (West 2002).
591. Crystal Lake, 664 N.W.2d at 654-55.
592. See id. at 664.
593. Id. at 655, 663.
594. Id. at 662.
595. See id. at 664.
596. Id. at 669.
597. Id. at 671.
598. Id. at 663.
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who used a wheelchair.599 This failure violates the intent of the
WFEA.6 °°
4. New Jersey
In Tynan v. Vicinage 13 of the Superior Court,6°' the court
found that the definition of "handicapped" is broader under the New
Jersey Law Against Discrimination ("LAD")
602 than the ADA.603
Under LAD, "handicapped" does not require the alleged
handicapping condition result in substantial limitation of a major life
activity.6°4 Thus, stress disorders may constitute a disability under
LAD and not under the ADA.605 In this case, Tynan, according to
her doctor, suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, migraine
headaches, hypertension, and anxiety panic attacks.606 While on
medical leave, her doctor recommended in writing that "Tynan must
report to a different administration upon return" because her
disabilities were exacerbated by her conflicts with her supervisor,
Pardo.6 °7 The Human Resources Division had documentation from
Tynan's physician directing that she have no contact with Pardo, but
Tynan was forced to make an extended leave request to Pardo.
60 8
Pardo denied her request for an extended leave. °9 After Tynan
asked if she could appeal Pardo's denial of the extended leave
request, specifically stating that her disability had not been
accommodated, she was advised that her failure to return to work
two days earlier "ha[d] been treated as a resignation."
610
The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary
judgment. 611 The trial judge was concerned with Tynan's failure to
599. Id. at 671.
600. Id.
601. Tynan v. Vicinage 13 of the Superior Court, 798 A.2d 648 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2002).
602. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-1 to -42 (West 2002 & Supp. 2003).
603. Tynan, 798 A.2d at 655.
604. Id.
605. See id.
606. Id. at 656.
607. Id. at 653 (internal quotation marks omitted).
608. Id.
609. Id.
610. Id. at 653-54.
611. Id. at654.
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specifically indicate the accommodation she requested.612 The
Superior Court of New Jersey reversed and remanded, holding that
although employees must request accommodation, they need not
make specific requests for what they seek.613 An employee may use
plain English to make clear that assistance for his or her disability is
desired, but is not required to mention the ADA or any other legal
authority for that assistance.614 "Once a handicapped employee has
requested assistance, it is the employer who must make the
reasonable effort to determine the appropriate accommodation."
615
The court held that the vicinage was aware of Tynan's
disabilities and desire for assistance. 616 Thus, the burden was on the
vicinage to implement the interactive process.617 By failing to do so,
the vicinage forced Tynan's termination by requiring her to return to
work without any accommodation.
618
5. Pennsylvania
In Stultz v. Reese Bros., Inc., 619 the court held that Reese
Brothers violated the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act
("PHRA") 620 by failing to participate in the interactive process.
621
Reese Brothers "had an obligation to consult with [Stultz] to
ascertain the precise job-related limitations imposed by [his]
disability and, following [Reese Brothers'] own preliminary
investigation, had an obligation to share both its findings with
[Stultz] and consult with him to identify alternative
accommodations."
622
Stultz, who was visually impaired, applied for a job with Reese
Brothers. 623 He provided his interviewer with two catalogs of visual
aid products after discussing available aids to assist him in
612. Id.
613. Id. at 656.
614. Id. at 657.
615. Id.
616. Id. at 658.
617. Id.
618. Id.
619. Stultz v. Reese Bros., Inc., 835 A.2d 754 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
620. 43 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 951-63 (1991 & Supp. 2003).
621. Stultz, 835 A.2d at 762-63.
622. Id. at 763.
623. Id. at 758.
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performing his potential job.624 These catalogs were forwarded to
Marchey, the manager in the Information Technology Department.
625
Marchey contacted EIS International, the developer of the software
program Reese Brothers used.626 EIS advised Marchey that the
software-driven visual aid products in the catalogue were not
compatible with the EIS software program, and that installation of
such software would void license and maintenance agreements with
EIS.627 After receiving this information, Marchey decided no
reasonable accommodation could be made for Stultz.
628
Although the employer's duty to participate in the interactive
process was triggered, there was no interaction between Reese
Brothers and Stultz, because Reese Brothers refused to participate in
the process. 629 In fact, after the interactive process was triggered,
Reese Brothers only contacted Stultz once, to deny him
employment.
630
Although [Reese Brothers] did not have an affirmative duty
to prove there was no reasonable accommodation available,
it did have a duty to engage in a meaningful dialogue with
[Stultz] to determine if a reasonable accommodation could
be made for him .... [H]owever, in order to prove that the
employer failed to participate in the interactive process the
individual must still demonstrate he reasonably could have
been accommodated and performed the job.631
IV. CONCLUSION
One cannot help drawing a parallel between the current Court's
cutback of civil rights and the national amnesia about the Civil War
and Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts as the Reconstruction Era drew
to a close. The history of civil rights laws in America informs us that
the dismantling of slavery and desegregation were both based upon
national consensus arrived at as the results of intense social and
624. Id.
625. Id. at 759.
626. Id.
627. Id.
628. Id.
629. Id. at 763.
630. Id.
631. Id.
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political struggles. Both were achieved by the exercise of federal
authority against the then-unwilling States. On both points, i.e.,
slavery and segregation, history has unequivocally shown that the
unwilling Southern States were in the wrong and the federal
intervention was right morally, politically, and practically. This
judgment of history serves, more than anything, as the stabilizing
basis for a continuing and increasingly solid national consensus over
issues that once bitterly divided the nation.
As the pendulum swings again, and civil rights protections again
become a national focus, the experiments of the various states may
help to develop a solid national commitment to protecting the civil
rights of all people, including those with disabilities.
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APPENDIX: A SUMMARY OF STATE DISABILITY LAW
ALABAMA
Alabama's disability nondiscrimination law prohibits discrimination
against the "physically disabled" in public employment, housing
accommodations, and public accommodations. ALA. CODE §§ 21-7-
2 to -7-9 (1997 & Supp. 2003). "Physically disabled" is not defined
by statute.
It is the policy of this state that the blind, the visually
handicapped and the otherwise physically disabled shall be
employed in the state service, the service of the political
subdivisions of the state, in the public schools and in all
other employment supported in whole or in part by public
funds on the same terms and conditions as the able-bodied,
unless it is shown that the particular disability prevents the
performance of the work involved.
Id. § 21-7-8. Alabama does not have a disability nondiscrimination
law applicable to private employers.
ALASKA
The Alaska Human Rights Law prohibits discrimination in public
and private employment, housing, and credit and financing based on
"disability," and incorporates the federal definition of disability.
ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.300(9), (12)-(13) (Michie 2003).
Section 18.80.220(a) impliedly imposes a duty on employers to make
reasonable accommodations for disabled employees. Moody-
Herrera v. State Dept. of Natural Res., 967 P.2d 79, 87 (Alaska
1998). This Alaska statute is modeled on federal law.
ARIZONA
The Arizona Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination in public and
private employment and housing on the basis of "handicap." ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1463(B), -1491.19(A) (West 1999 & Supp.
2003). The definition of handicap incorporates the federal definition
of disability. Id. § 41-1461.
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In 2002, the word handicap in section 41-1463(B)(1) was changed to
"disability." Id. § 41-1463(B)(1).
Title VII case law is persuasive in interpreting the Arizona Civil
Rights Act since the Act is modeled after federal employment
discrimination laws. Timmons v. City of Tucson, 830 P.2d 871, 875
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1991).
Cancer is a disability covered by section 41-1463(B)(1) (as noted
above, "disability" was termed "handicap" at the time of this
decision). Burris v. City of Phoenix, 875 P.2d 1340, 1345 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1993).
ARKANSAS
The Arkansas Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination in public and
private employment, public accommodations, property transactions,
finance and credit, and voting and participation in the political
process on the basis of "any sensory, mental, or physical
disability." ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-107(a) (Michie Supp. 2003).
"Disability" is defined as "a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits a major life function.. . ." Id. § 16-123-102(3).
CALIFORNIA
California's FEHA prohibits discrimination based on "physical
disability, mental disability, [or] medical condition" in public and
private employment. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940(a) (West Supp.
2004). The definitions for "mental disability" and "physical
disability" explicitly use the federal definition as a floor for
coverage. Id. § 12926(i), (k). It further prohibits discrimination
based on disability with regard to housing accommodations. The
definition of "disability" incorporates the federal definition.
Id. § 12955.3. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 9, § 7025 (2004).
California's Unruh Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination based
on "disability" in public accommodations or business establishments,
as does the Disabled Persons Act. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51, 54 (West
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1982 & Supp. 2004). The Disabled Persons Act incorporates the
federal definition of disability. Id. § 54. A violation of the ADA is
deemed a violation of these state laws. Id. §§ 51, 54.
California law prohibits discrimination against individuals with
disabilities, as defined by federal law, in programs or activities
receiving financial assistance from the state. CAL. Gov'T CODE §
11135 (West 1992 & Supp. 2004).
Section 12926 of the California Code was passed to clarify that the
California Code is independent of and provides greater protection
than the ADA. Additionally, this provision provides a non-
exhaustive list of disabilities covered under California law,
including diabetes and heart disease. Unlike the ADA,
California does not require a "substantial" impairment.
COLORADO
Colorado's Anti-Discrimination Act prohibits discrimination in
public and private employment, housing, and public accommodation
on the basis of "disability." COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 24-34-402, -502, -
601(2) (2001). The definition of "disability" incorporates the federal
definition. Id. § 24-34-301(2.5).
In employment practices it is not a violation to discriminate against
disabled persons if "there is no reasonable accommodation that the
employer can make with regard to the disability, the disability
actually disqualifies the person from the job, and the disability has a
significant impact on the job." Id. § 24-34-402.
In Phelps v. Field Real Estate Co., 793 F. Supp. 1535, 1544 (D.
Colo. 1991), aff'd 991 F.2d 645, 650 (10th Cir. 1993), the defendant
conceded that HIV infection is a disability under Colorado law.
CONNECTICUT
The Connecticut Human Rights and Opportunities Act prohibits
"physical disability" discrimination in public and private
employment, housing, public accommodations, and other areas.
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CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46a-58 to -81r (West Supp. 2003).
"Physically disabled" is defined as "chronic physical handicap,
infirmity or impairment, whether congenital or resulting from bodily
injury, organic processes or changes or from illness, including, but
not limited to, epilepsy, deafness or hearing impairment or reliance
on a wheelchair or other remedial appliance or device." Id. § 46a-
51(15). There is no requirement for substantial limitation on major
life activity. Beason v. United Techs. Corp., 337 F.3d 271, 276 (2d
Cir. 2003).
DELAWARE
The Delaware Handicapped Persons Employment Protections Act
("DHPEPA") prohibits discrimination in public and private
employment and incorporates the federal definition of disability, but
defines "substantially limits" to mean that the "impairment so affects
a person as to create a likelihood that such person will experience
difficulty in securing, retaining or advancing in employment because
of a handicap." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 722(4)(c)(4) (1995). The
definition of "regarded as having an impairment" includes "a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life
activities because of the attitudes of others." Id. § 722(4)(c)(3). The
DHPEPA further provides that the "regarded as" having an
impairment provision "is intended to be interpreted in conformity
with the federal Rehabilitation Act." Id.
Employers are not required to make accommodations for newly
employed handicapped persons if "the cost of such changes would
exceed 5 percent of the annual salary or annualized hourly wage of
the job in question." Id. § 722(6)(d)(1).
FLORIDA
The Florida Civil Rights Act provides that "[a]ny person with or
perceived as having acquired immune deficiency syndrome, acquired
immune deficiency syndrome related complex, or human
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immunodeficiency virus shall have every protection made available
to handicapped persons." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.50(2) (West Supp.
2004).
An employee has a duty to mitigate damages byseeking employment
elsewhere. Reiner v. Family Ford, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (M.D.
Fla.2001).
The Florida Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination in public and
private employment on the basis of handicap. FLA. STAT. ANN. § §
760.01-.11.
However, public accommodation, housing accommodation, and
public employment nondiscrimination rights are granted to the
"physically disabled," which is defined as "any person having a
physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities." Id. § 413.08(6)(a).
Florida prohibits the use of HIV testing as a condition of
employment and prohibits discrimination against any individual on
the basis of "knowledge or belief that the individual has taken a[n
HIV] test or the results or perceived results of such test." Id. §
760.50(3)(b).
GEORGIA
The Georgia Equal Employment for Persons with Disabilities Code
prohibits discrimination in public and private employment on the
basis of "disability." GA. CODE ANN. § 34-6A-4 (West 2003).
"Disability" incorporates the federal definition. Id. § 34-6A-2.
Nondiscrimination provisions do not apply to an applicant for
employment who has "[a]ny communicable disease, either carried by
or afflicting the applicant." Id. § 34-6A-3(b)(2).
HAWAII
The Hawaii Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination in access to
state services, employment, public accommodations, and housing on
the basis of "disability." HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 368-1.5(a), 378-
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2(1)(A), 489-3, 515-3 (1993). The definition of disability
incorporates the federal definition. Id. § 368-1.5(b).
"The legislature finds and declares that the practice of discrimination
because of race, color, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, marital
status, national origin, ancestry, or disability in employment,
housing, public accommodations, or access to services receiving
state financial assistance is against public policy." Id. § 368-1.
Section 368-13(d) of the.Act states:
When the executive director [of the civil rights
commission] determines after [an] investigation that there is
reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful discriminatory
practice within the commission's jurisdiction has been
committed, the executive director shall immediately
endeavor to eliminate any alleged unlawful discriminatory
practice by informal methods such as conference,
conciliation, and persuasion.
Id. § 368-13(d).
IDAHO
The Idaho Commission on Human Rights Act prohibits
discrimination in public and private employment as well as real
estate transactions and financing on the basis of "disability." IDAHO
CODE § 67-5909(1)-(4), (7)-(10) (Michie 2001).
The statutory definition of "disability" incorporates the federal
definition, although "substantial limitation" is not specified as being
imposed on a major life activity. Id. § 67-5902(15).
ILLINOIS
The Illinois Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination in public and
private employment, housing, credit and financing, and public
accommodations on the basis of "handicap," which is defined as a
determinable physical or mental characteristic of a person,
including, but not limited to, a determinable physical
characteristic which necessitates the person's use of a
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guide, hearing or support dog, the history of such
characteristic, or the perception of such characteristic by the
person complained against, which may result from disease,
injury, congenital condition of birth or functional disorder.
775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-103(I) (West 2001).
For purposes of employment, the characteristic must be "unrelated to
the person's ability to perform the duties of a particular job or
position;" for purposes of housing, the characteristic must be
"unrelated to the person's ability to acquire, rent or maintain a
housing accommodation;" for purposes of credit, the characteristic
must be "unrelated to a person's ability to repay;" and for purposes
of public accommodations, the characteristic must be "unrelated to
the person's ability to utilize and benefit from a place of public
accommodation." Id. 5/1-103 (I)(1)-(4).
INDIANA
The Indiana Civil Rights Law prohibits discrimination in public and
private employment, housing, public accommodations, and education
based on "disability." IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-1-2(a) (Michie 1997).
"Disability" is defined as "the physical or mental condition of a
person that constitutes a substantial disability." Id. § 22-9-1-3(r).
IOWA
The Iowa Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination in public and
private employment, housing, and public accommodations on the
basis of disability, which is defined to include "the condition of a
person with a positive human immunodeficiency virus test result, a
diagnosis of [AIDS], a diagnosis of [AIDS]-related complex, or any
other condition related to [AIDS]." IOWA CODE ANN. § 216.2.5
(West 2000). The inclusion of positive HIV test results within the
definition of disability explicitly does "not preclude" the inclusion of
other "conditions resulting from other contagious or infectious
diseases" from that definition. Id.
The Iowa Administrative Code incorporates the federal definition of
disability. IOWA ADMrN. CODE r. 161-8.26(216) (2003).
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KANSAS
The Kansas Act Against Discrimination prohibits discrimination in
public and private employment, public accommodations and
services, and housing on the basis of "disability." KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 44-1002 (2000). "Disability" incorporates the federal definition.
Id. § 44-1002(j).
KENTUCKY
"'Physical disability' means the physical condition of a person
whether congenital or acquired, which constitutes a substantial
disability to that person and is demonstrable by medically accepted
clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques." KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
207.130(2) (Michie 1999).
Employers may make pre-employment inquiries concerning the
existence of an applicant's disability and about the extent to which
that disability has been overcome by treatment or medication. Id. §
207.140(1). Nondiscrimination protections do not apply in the
case of applicants for employment or housing who have "any
communicable disease." Id. § 207.140(2).
LOUISIANA
The Louisiana Civil Rights Act for Handicapped Persons prohibits
discrimination in employment, education, housing, and public
services on the basis of "handicap." LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§
46:2211, :2254 (West 1999). "Handicap" incorporates the federal
definition of disability: "[A]ny person who has an impairment which
substantially limits one or more life activities or (a) has a record of
such an impairment or (b) is regarded as having such an
impairment." Id. § 46:2253(1).
"'Impairment' means retardation; any physical or physiological
disorder or condition, or prior mental disorder or condition, but does
not include chronic alcoholism or any other form of active drug
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addiction; any cosmetic disfigurement; or an anatomical loss of body
systems." Id. § 46:2253(2).
"'Major life activities' mean functions such as caring for one's self,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning, and working." Id. § 46:2253(3).
MAINE
The Maine Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination in public and
private employment, housing, public accommodations, financing,
and education on the basis of "physical or mental disability." ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4552 (West 2002). "Disability" is defined
as "any disability, infirmity, malformation, disfigurement, congenital
defect or mental condition caused by bodily injury, accident, disease,
birth defect, environmental conditions or illness, and includes the
physical or mental condition of a person that constitutes a substantial
disability as determined by a physician or, in the case of [a] mental
disability, by a psychiatrist or psychologist, as well as any other
health or sensory impairment that requires special education,
vocational rehabilitation or related services. Id. § 4553 (7-A)
(emphasis added).
The statute defines a "person with physical or mental disability" or
an "individual with a physical or mental disability" as a person who:
"(A) [h]as a physical or mental disability; (B) [h]as a record of a
physical or mental disability; or (C) [i]s regarded as having a
physical or mental disability. Id. § 4553 (7-B).
As noted in Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 937 n.1 (1st Cir.
1997), the concept of disability under the Maine Human Rights Act
is co-extensive with that of the Americans with Disabilities Act.
MARYLAND
The Maryland Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination in public
accommodations and retail services, by persons licensed or regulated
by the State Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation, in
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public and private employment, and in housing on the basis of
physical or mental handicap. MD. ANN. CODE, art. 49B, §§ 5(b),
8(a), 16(a), 22(a) (1998). Disability is defined as
any physical disability, infirmity, malformation or
disfigurement which is caused by bodily injury, birth defect
or illness including epilepsy, and which shall include, but
not be limited to, any degree of paralysis, amputation, lack
of physical coordination, blindness or visual impairment,
deaffiess or hearing impairment, muteness or speech
impediment or physical reliance on a seeing eye dog,
wheelchair, or other remedial appliance or device; and any
mental impairment or deficiency as, but not limited to,
retardation or such other which may have necessitated
remedial or special education and related services.
Id. § 15(g).
The Maryland Commission on Human Relations has interpreted
the statutory definition as including "infection with human
immunodeficiency virus." MD. REGS. CODE tit. 14, §
14.03.02.02B(6)(a) (1999). In its interpretation of the Act, the
Commission incorporated the federal definition of disability,
including a provision similar to the ADA's "perceived-as" disabled
element. See id. § 14.03.02.02B(6)(e).
The statute prohibits discrimination against public school teachers on
the basis of "handicap." MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 6-104(b) (2001).
However, "handicap" is not defined.
MASSACHUSETTS
The Massachusetts Unlawful Discrimination Law prohibits
discrimination in public and private employment and real estate
transactions on the basis of "handicap." MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 155B,
§ 4 (1996 & Supp. 2003). "Handicap" incorporates the federal
definition of disability-but does not include current, illegal use of a
controlled substance. Id. ch. 151B, § 1(17).
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MICHIGAN
The Michigan Handicappers' Civil Rights Act prohibits
discrimination in public and private employment, public
accommodations, public services, housing and real estate, and
educational facilities for handicapped individuals. MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 37.1102(1) (2001). "Handicap" incorporates the federal
definition, but instead of impairment, the statute uses the term
"determinable physical or mental characteristic of an individual,
which may result from disease, injury, congenital condition of birth,
or functional disorder." Id. § 37.1103(d)(i).
Disability does not include: "[a] determinable physical or mental
characteristic caused by the current illegal use of a controlled
substance by that individual," or "[a] determinable physical or
mental characteristic caused by the use of an alcoholic liquor by that
individual, if that physical or mental characteristic prevents that
individual from performing the duties of his or her job." Id. §
37.1103(f)(i)-(ii).
In Robinson v. Henry Ford Health Systems, 892 F. Supp. 176, 180
(E.D. Mich. 1994), aff'd without opinion, 86 F.3d 1156 (6th Cir.
1996), the court noted that persons "who have tested positive for
AIDS or the AIDS-related HIV virus are covered as handicapped or
disabled individuals under both the Michigan and federal
[rehabilitation] acts."
MINNESOTA
The Minnesota Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination in public
and private employment, public accommodations, housing, public
services, and education on the basis of "disability." MINN. STAT. §
363A.02 (1991 & Supp. 2004). The statutory definition of
"disability" incorporates the federal definition, although impairment
may be "physical, sensory, or mental" and the limitation on one or
more major life activities must be "material[]." Id. § 363A.03(12).
The Minnesota Court of Appeals interpreted this provision to apply
to asymptomatic HIV infection in Beaulieu v. Clausen, 491 N.W.2d
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662, 666 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), on the basis that individuals with
HIV are materially limited in several major life activities, including
social participation (because of emotional problems as well as
ostracism), sexual activities, child-bearing, access to insurance
coverage, and limitations on career choices involving extensive
training resulting from limited life expectancy, and limitations on
ability to work due to need for medical care.
MISSISSIPPI
Mississippi's employment law prohibits discrimination in public
employment and by employers receiving state funding on the basis of
"handicap." MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-9-149 (2003). However, there is
no statutory definition of "handicap."
Mississippi does not have a nondiscrimination law covering private
employment or other areas.
MISSOURI
The Missouri HIV and Public Health Act provides that the Missouri
Human Rights Act, Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 213.010-.137 (1996 & Supp.
2004), "shall apply to individuals with HIV infection.. . ." Id. §
191.665.
The Missouri Human Rights Act ("MHRA") prohibits discrimination
in housing, commercial real estate loans, employment, and public
accommodations, on the basis of "disability." Id. §§ 213.040-.065.
The statutory definition of "disability" incorporates the federal
definition. Id. § 213.010(4). The MHRA also includes
"associational" discrimination. Id. § 213.070(4).
[T]he term "disability" does not include current, illegal use
of or addiction to a controlled substance... however, a
person may be considered to have a disability if that person:
(a) Has successfully completed a supervised drug
rehabilitation program and is no longer engaging in the
illegal use of, and is not currently addicted to, a controlled
substance or has otherwise been rehabilitated successfully
and is no longer engaging in such use and is not currently
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addicted; (b) Is participating in a supervised rehabilitation
program and is no longer engaging in illegal use of
controlled substances; or (c) Is erroneously regarded as
currently illegally using, or being addicted to, a controlled
substance.
Id. §§ 213.010(4)(a)-(c).
MONTANA
The Montana Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination in public
and private employment, public accommodations, housing, and
education, on the basis of "disability." MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 49-2-
303 to -309 (2003). "Disability" incorporates the federal definition.
Id. § 49-2-101(19).
NEBRASKA
The Nebraska Individual Rights Act prohibits discrimination in
public and private employment, housing, education, and public
accommodations on the basis that the individual discriminated
against "is suffering or is suspected of suffering from human
immunodeficiency virus infection or acquired immunodeficiency
syndrome." NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-168 (1997). Each agency of the
state government was required to "examine policies and practices
within its jurisdiction that [might] intentionally or unintentionally
result in discrimination against a person who ha[d] taken a[n] [HIV]
antibody or antigen test or who ha[d] been diagnosed as having
[AIDS] or [ARC] to ascertain the extent and types of discrimination
that [might] exist," and to report its findings to the state legislature
by December 1, 1988. Id. § 20-167.
The Nebraska Fair Employment Practice Act prohibits
discrimination in public and private employment on the basis of
"disability." NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1101 (1998). Nebraska's
definition of "disability" incorporates the federal definition. Id. § 48-
1102(9). "Disability shall not include homosexuality, bisexuality,
transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism,
gender-identity disorders not resulting in physical impairments, other
sexual behavior disorders, compulsive gambling, kleptomania,
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pyromania, or psychoactive substance use disorders resulting from
current illegal use of drugs." Id.
NEVADA
The Nevada Equal Opportunity for Employment Law prohibits
discrimination in public and private employment on the basis of
"disability." NEV. REv. STAT. 613.330(1) (2003). Nevada's
definition of "disability" incorporates the federal definition. Id.
613.310(1).
The Nevada Fair Housing Law prohibits discrimination in housing
on the basis of "disability." Id. 118.020(1). The term "disability" in
this provision incorporates the federal definition. Id. 118.045.
NEW HAMPSHIRE
The New Hampshire Law Against Discrimination prohibits
discrimination in public and private employment, housing, and
public accommodations on the basis of "physical or mental
disability." N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:1 (1995). The New
Hampshire definition of "disability" incorporates the federal
definition. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:2.IV (1995 & Supp.
2003).
NEW JERSEY
The New Jersey Law Against Discrimination prohibits
discrimination in public and private employment, public
accommodations and facilities (including public and private schools),
public and private housing, and real estate transactions on the basis
of "handicap," which includes "AIDS or HIV infection." N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 10:5-4.1,:5-5(q) (West 2002 & Supp. 2004).
"Handicapped" means suffering from physical disability,
infirmity, malformation or disfigurement which is caused
by bodily injury, birth defect or illness including epilepsy
and other seizure disorders, and which shall include, but not
be limited to, any degree of paralysis, amputation, lack of
physical coordination, blindness or visual impediment,
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deafness or hearing impediment, muteness or speech
impediment or physical reliance on a service or guide dog,
wheelchair, or other remedial appliance or device, or from
any mental, psychological or developmental disability
resulting from anatomical, psychological, physiological or
neurological conditions which prevents the normal exercise
of any bodily or mental functions or is demonstrable,
medically or psychologically, by accepted clinical or
laboratory diagnostic techniques. Handicapped shall also
mean suffering from AIDS or HIV infection.
Id. § 10:5-5(q). "HIV infection" is defined as "infection with the
human immunodeficiency virus or any other related virus identified
as a probable causative agent of AIDS." Id. § 10:5-5(gg).
In Poff v. Caro, 549 A.2d 900, 903 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987),
the court ruled that New Jersey law prohibits housing discrimination
based on the perception that an individual has AIDS or the
"potential" to develop AIDS, noting that there is no rational basis for
distinguishing between those with a disability and those so
perceived.
NEW MEXICO
New Mexico's Human Immunodeficiency Virus Related Test
Limitation Law prohibits employers from requiring disclosure of
HIV-related test results for purposes of hiring, promotion, or
continued employment. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-IOA-1 (Michie
2000).
New Mexico's Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination in public
and private employment, housing, and public accommodations on the
basis of "physical or mental handicap" or "serious medical
condition." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7 (Michie 2000 & Supp. 2003).
"Handicap" incorporates the federal definition of disability. Id. § 28-
1-2(M) (repealed effective July 1, 2006).
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NEW YORK
The New York Human Rights Law prohibits discrimination in public
and private employment, public accommodations, housing, and
financing based on "disability." N.Y. ExEc. LAW §§ 296, 296-a
(McKinney 2003 & Supp. 2004). "Disability" is defined as
(a) a physical, mental or medical impairment resulting from
anatomical, physiological, genetic or neurological
conditions which prevents the exercise of a normal bodily
function or is demonstrable by medically accepted clinical
or laboratory diagnostic techniques or (b) a record of such
an impairment or (c) a condition regarded by others as such
an impairment.
Id. § 292(21).
The New York Division on Human Rights has interpreted this
provision to include HIV infection. N. Y Division on Human Rights:
Policy Statement on AIDS-Based Discrimination, , [8B Fair Emp.
Pracs. Manual] Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 455:3081 (Aug. 1992). See
Petri v. Bank of New York Co., 582 N.Y.S.2d 608, 611 (Sup. Ct.
1992) (explaining that asymptomatic HIV infection, whether actual
or perceived, is a disability under New York law).
NORTH CAROLINA
The North Carolina Persons With Disabilities Act ("NCPDA")
prohibits discrimination in employment, public accommodations,
public services, and public transportation on the basis of handicap.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168A-5 to -8 (2003). The NCPDA incorporates
the federal definition of disability. A "[p]hysical or mental
impairment" is defined as:
(i) any physiological disorder or abnormal condition,
cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss, caused by
bodily injury, birth defect or illness, affecting one or more
of the following body systems: neurological;
musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory,
including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive;
digestive; genitourinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and
endocrine; or (ii) any mental disorder, such as mental
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retardation, organic brain syndrome, mental illness, specific
learning disabilities, and other developmental disabilities,
but (iii) excludes (A) sexual preferences; (B) active
alcoholism or drug addiction or abuse; and (C) any
disorder, condition or disfigurement which is temporary in
nature leaving no residual impairment.
Id. § 168A-3(7a)(a).
However, the NCPDA allows HIV testing ofjob applicants, denial of
employment to job applicants based on HIV status, and HIV testing
as an annual medical examination routinely required of all
employees by the employer. Id. § 168A-5(b). Reassignment or
termination of employment is allowed if the employee poses a
significant risk to the employee or others, or if the employee is
unable to perform the normally assigned duties of the job. Id. While
the NCPDA includes "working" among the activities identified as
major life activities, it allows an employer to inquire whether "a
person has the ability to perform duties of the job in question." Id.
§§ 168A-3(7a)(b), -5(b)(5).
In Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc., 388 S.E.2d 134 (N.C.
1990), the Supreme Court of North Carolina interpreted the North
Carolina statute (then titled the North Carolina Handicapped Persons
Protection Act) as not applying to HIV infection because (1) the
statute exempted "communicable diseases" from the definition of
handicap and (2) though HIV might limit a person's ability to work,
HIV did not limit a "major life activity" as defined by the act. Id. at
137-39. At the time of the Burgess decision, the North Carolina
statute did not include "working" as a "major life activity." Thus,
because "working" is now included in the definition of a "major life
activity," the statute may now apply to HIV. N.C. GEN. STAT. §
168A-3(7a)(b).
NORTH DAKOTA
The North Dakota Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination in
public and private employment, housing, property rights, public
accommodations, public services, and credit transactions on the basis
of "disability." N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-02.4-03 to 14-02.4-17,
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(1997). "Disability" incorporates the federal definition: "a physical
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities, a record of this impairment, or being regarded as having
this impairment." Id. § 14-02.4-02.
OHIO
The Ohio Civil Rights Commission Act prohibits discrimination in
public and private employment, public accommodations, housing,
and granting of credit on the basis of "disability." OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 4112.02 (Anderson 2001 & Supp. 2002). The statute
incorporates the federal definition of disability, setting forth as major
life activities the "functions of caring for one's self, performing
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning,
and working." Id. § 4112.01(13).
Additionally, the statute sets forth specific inclusions and exclusions
from coverage as follows:
(a) "[P]hysical or mental impairment" includes any of the
following:
(i) Any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic
disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more
of the following body systems: neurological;
musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory,
including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive;
digestive; genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic; skin;
and endocrine;
(ii) Any mental or psychological disorder, including,
but not limited to, mental retardation, organic brain
syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific
learning disabilities;
(iii) Diseases and conditions, including, but not limited
to, orthopedic, visual, speech, and hearing
impairments, cerebral palsy, autism, epilepsy, muscular
dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, cancer, heart disease,
diabetes, human immunodeficiency virus infection,
mental retardation, emotional illness, drug addiction,
and alcoholism.
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(b) "Physical or mental impairment" does not include any
of the following:
(i) Homosexuality and bisexuality;
(ii) Transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia,
exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity disorders not
resulting from physical impairments, or other sexual
behavior disorders;
(iii) Compulsive gambling, kleptomania, or pyromania;
(iv) Psychoactive substance use disorders resulting
from current illegal use of a controlled substance.
Id. § 4112.01(16)(a)-(b).
Ohio Civil Rights Commission regulations include "perceived as"
handicapped within the definition:
"Disabled person" includes any person who presently has a
disability as defined by division (A)(13) of section 4112.01
of the Revised Code or any person who has had a disability
as defined by division (A)(13) of section 4112.01 of the
Revised Code, who no longer has any functional limitation,
but who is treated by a respondent as having such a
disability, or any person who is regarded as disabled by a
respondent.
OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4112-5-02(H) (1997). See Cleveland v. Ohio
Civil Rights Comm'n, 648 N.E.2d 516, 518 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
OKLAHOMA
The Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act prohibits discrimination in
public and private employment, public accommodations, and
housing on the basis of "handicap." OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, §§ 1302-
1311, 1402, 1452-1453 (2002). "Handicap" incorporates the federal
definition of disability: "a person who has a physical or mental
impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's
major life activities, has a record of such an impairment or is
regarded as having such an impairment." Id. § 1301(4).
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OREGON
The Oregon Civil Rights of Disabled Persons Act prohibits
discrimination in public and private employment, public
accommodations, and housing on the basis of "disability." OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 659A.112, .142, .145 (2001). "Disability" generally
incorporates the federal definition, but defines "major life activity"
as including, but not limited to, "self-care, ambulation,
communication, transportation, education, socialization, employment
and ability to acquire, rent or maintain property." Id. § 659A.100(l)-
(2)(a).
"Substantially limits" is defined as:
(A) The impairment renders the person unable to perform a
major life activity that the average person in the general
population can perform; or
(B) The impairment significantly restricts the condition,
manner or duration under which an individual can perform
a particular major life activity as compared to the condition,
manner or duration under which the average person in the
general population can perform the same major life activity.
Id. § 659A.100(2)(d).
PENNSYLVANIA
The Pennsylvania Human Relations Act covers handicap
discrimination, including discrimination on basis of perceived
handicap, in employment, housing, and public accommodations on
the basis of "handicap or disability." PA. CONS. STAT. tit. 43, §§
954-55 (West 2003). "Handicap or disability" incorporates the
federal definition of disability. Id. § 954(p. 1).
RHODE ISLAND
The Rhode Island Civil Rights of People with Disabilities Act
prohibits discrimination in employment, housing, and public
accommodations on the basis of "disability." R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-
87-2 (1998 & Supp. 2003).
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The Act incorporates the federal definition of disability and cross-
references the federal Rehabilitation Act and Americans with
Disabilities Act for its definition of prohibited, discriminatory acts or
conduct. Id. § 42-87-1(1)-(2).
The Rhode Island Equal Opportunity and Affirmative Action Act
prohibits discrimination in public and private employment on the
basis of "disability." "Disability" incorporates the federal defiition
and "includes any disability which is provided protection under the
[ADA] and federal regulations pertaining to the [ADA]." Id. § 28-5-
6(4) (2003) (citations omitted).
SOUTH CAROLINA
The South Carolina Human Affairs Law prohibits discrimination in
public and private employment on the basis of "disability." S.C.
CODE ANN. § 1-13-80 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2003). "Disability"
incorporates the federal definition and provides that the term "must
be interpreted in a manner consistent with federal regulations
promulgated pursuant to the [ADA]." Id. § 1-13-30(n).
The South Carolina Bill of Rights for Handicapped Persons prohibits
discrimination in public accommodations, public services, and
housing on the basis of "handicap." S.C. CODE ANN. § 43-33-530
(Law. Co-op. 1986 & Supp. 2003). "Handicap" is defined as "a
substantial physical or mental impairment... acquired by...
disease, where the impairment is verified by medical findings and
appears reasonably certain to continue throughout the lifetime of the
individual without substantial improvement." Id. § 43-33-560. The
definition excludes individuals who are "only regarded as being
handicapped." Id. The definition of "handicapped person" for
purposes of South Carolina law incorporates the federal definition
and "any other definition prescribed by federal law or regulation for
use by agencies of state government which serve handicapped
persons." S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-7-35 (1986).
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SOUTH DAKOTA
The South Dakota Human Rights Act Law prohibits discrimination
in public and private employment, housing, education, and public
accommodations on the basis of "disability." S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§§ 20-13-10 to -11, -20, -22 to -23 (Michie 2003). "Disability"
incorporates the federal definition. Id. § 20-13-1(4).
TENNESSEE
The Tennessee Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination in public
and private employment, public accommodations, and housing on the
basis of "handicap." TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-21-401 to -404, -501, -
601 (1998). "Handicap" incorporates the federal definition of
disability. Id. § 4-21-102(9)(A).
TEXAS
The Texas Commission on Human Rights Act prohibits
discrimination in public and private employment based on
"disability" and incorporates the federal definition of disability.
TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.002(6) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2004).
The Texas Rights and Responsibilities of Persons with Disabilities
Act prohibits discrimination in housing accommodations and public
facilities based on "disability." TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §
121.001-121.011 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2004). "Disability" is
defined as a "mental or physical disability, including mental
retardation, hearing impairment, deafness, speech impairment, visual
impairment, or any health impairment that requires special
ambulatory devices or services." Id. § 121.002(4).
UTAH
The Utah Anti-Discrimination Act prohibits discrimination in public
and private employment on the basis of "disability," which
incorporates the federal definition of disability. UTAH CODE ANN. §
34A-5-102 (2003).
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VERMONT
The Vermont Fair Employment Practice Act prohibits discrimination
in public and private employment on the basis of "a person's having
a positive test result from an HIV-related blood test." VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 495(a)(6) (1987 & Supp. 2003).
The Vermont Discrimination Law prohibits discrimination in public
accommodations and housing on the basis of "disability."
"Disability" incorporates the federal definition. Id. tit 9, § 4501.
VIRGINIA
The Virginians with Disabilities Act prohibits discrimination in
public and private employment, education, public accommodations,
and housing on the basis of "disability." VA. CODE ANN. §§ 51.5-41
to -42, -44 to -45 (Michie 2003). "Disability" incorporates the
federal definition. Id. § 51.5-3.
WASHINGTON
The Washington Law Against Discrimination prohibits
discrimination in public and private employment, public
accommodations, housing and real estate transactions, and financing
and credit transactions on the basis of "sensory, mental, or physical
disability." WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.010 (West 2002). No
definition of disability is provided.
WEST VIRGINIA
The West Virginia Human Rights Act ("WVHRA") prohibits
discrimination in employment, public accommodations, and housing
on the basis of "disability." W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5-11-4 (Michie
2002 & Supp. 2003).
"Disability" incorporates the federal definition of disability. Id. § 5-
11-3(m).
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In Benjamin R. v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 390 S.E.2d 814, 818 (W.
Va. 1990), the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals ruled that
HIV infection is a handicap under the WVHRA on the basis that HIV
infection substantially impairs or limits the major life activity of
"socialization" because of the psychological impact resulting from
knowledge of one's HIV status; the WVHRA was subsequently
amended to conform more precisely to federal law.
WISCONSIN
The Wisconsin Fair Employment Act prohibits discrimination in
public and private employment on the basis of "disability." Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 111.321 (West 2003). "Disability" incorporates the
federal definition of disability. Id. § 111.32.
WYOMING
The Wyoming Fair Employment Practices Act prohibits
discrimination in public and private employment on the basis of
"handicap." WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-9-105 (Michie 2003). The
statute provides no definition for handicap. Id. § 27-9-102. The
Wyoming Department of Employment Disability Discrimination
Rules, ch. 5 § 2(a), incorporates the federal definition of disability.
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